Cultural Fatigue : The State and Minority Rights in Botswana by Solway, Jacqueline
Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 10
Winter 2011




Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the International Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Solway, Jacqueline (2011) ""Cultural Fatigue": The State and Minority Rights in Botswana," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol.
18: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol18/iss1/10




The circulation and intersection of supranational rights, discourses,
and practices with local struggles have contributed to victories,
disappointments, and in many instances, new articulations and
understandings of rights for local people. In Botswana, the ever-
increasing interaction of minority groups with international institutions,
laws and conventions, nongovernmental groups (NGOs), and the
Botswana courts has created a dialectic that continues to reshape
vernacular rights discourses. The state has also been a party in this
evolving dialectic and has found new means of intervening in the
process. The Botswana state prides itself on its liberal practices and has
received international acclaim as a result. The state's success in
promoting individual-based human rights provides a context for
minorities to self-identify, recognize their oppression, and safely
challenge the state. Initially disarmed by minority demands and legal
action, the state has now attempted to redefine the goals of minorities
and to reduce the substance and redress of justice claims to support for
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and celebration of minority groups' dance, food, and costume. This has
produced, in the words of minority activists, "culture fatigue." This
paper will examine these processes; consider the conflicting and
converging discourses and practices resulting from the mutual
absorption of rights dialogue on the part of local groups, international
bodies, and the state; and discuss the ways in which these have
supported, clashed with, strengthened, or distorted the positions and
outcomes of the various actors and their projects.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I examine some of the successes, failures,
indeterminacies, and ironies that have emerged in the struggle among
Botswana's "minority groups" for rights and recognition. Lawfare, to
borrow the Comaroffs' very apt term,' has been deployed to great effect
by and on behalf of minority groups in Botswana. Moreover, an
engagement with transnational movements and both suprastate and
nonstate external actors by all parties involved has recently altered the
playing field in a range of ways. To varying degrees, local struggles in
Botswana have absorbed global dispositions and rhetoric in a process of
partial "vernacularization."2
Global influences, it will be shown, have shaped the process, the
actors, and the still uncertain outcomes of recent struggles. Equally
important, by forcing the state to acknowledge and, more importantly,
to confront minority struggles, lawfare has led the state to seek new
means of intervening in the minority rights dialogue. A striking
consequence of the state's intervention is the current fashion and
proliferation of performative culture, much of it supported, if not
sponsored, by the state. In a set of converging processes, local groups
(minority and otherwise), the state, and the market are, for varying
reasons and interests, all engaged in a process to objectify and
commodify culture to be consumed locally and globally.3 This has
resulted in what many minority activists call "culture fatigue."
1. JOHN L. COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, INC. 56 (2009) [hereinafter
COMAROFF & COMAROFF, ETHNICITY]; John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and
Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1,
29-31 (Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff eds., 2006). Lawfare is waged via the use of
domestic or international law with the intention of damaging an opponent.
2. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Transplants and Cultural Translation: Making Human
Rights in the Vernacular, in HUMAN RIGHTs: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 265 (Mark
Goodale ed., 2009).
3. See COMAROFF & COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, supra note 1, at 140-141; Rosemary
Coombe, Possessing Culture: Political Economies of Community Subjects and Their
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Botswana is recognized internationally as Africa's "miracle,"4 its
"exception."5 It is heralded for its democratic achievements, political
stability, good governance, relatively low levels of corruption, absence of
violence, staggering economic growth,6 and, until recently, its mostly
untarnished and celebrated human rights record.7 Botswana's
successful liberalism and creation of relatively rational bureaucratic
structures and institutions have created the conditions for minority
groups to self-identify, recognize the basis and reality of their exclusion,
and find orderly and peaceful means of redress.8 Liberalism contains
paradoxes within it that lead to the kind of discontent and struggle
outlined in this paper. In particular, liberal democracy includes among
its core values, equality of citizenship and individual rights predicated
on the juridical abstract citizen. To the extent that liberalism succeeds,
it provides an ethos of possibility, choice, and new direction. Whether
this is a false, inflated, or unrealizable promise, liberalism at its best
Properties, in OWNERSHIP AND APPROPRIATION 105-27 (Mark Busse & Veronica Strang
eds., forthcoming 2011).
4. ABDI ISMAIL SAMATAR, AN AFRICAN MIRACLE: STATE AND CLASS LEADERSHIP AND
COLONIAL LEGACY IN BOTSWANA DEVELOPMENT (1999).
5. Economics Focus: The African Exception, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2002.
6. See J. CLARK LEITH, WHY BOTSWANA PROSPERED 120-22 (2005); SAMATAR, supra
note 4, at 3-5; RICHARD WERBNER, REASONABLE RADICALS AND CITIZENSHIP IN BOTSWANA:
THE PUBLIC ANTHROPOLOGY OF KALANGA ELITES 16-18 (2004); Daron Acemoglu et al., An
African Success Story: Botswana, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH 80, 80-84 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003); Democracy in Africa: A Good
Example, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2009, at 57; Botswana's Impatient President: Diamonds Are
Not For Ever, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2009, at 61. But see KENNETH GOOD, DIAMONDS,
DISPOSSESSION & DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 9-24 (2008) (discussing how Botswana's
economic dependence on diamond-generated revenue led to economic hardships).
7. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BOTSWANA (1999-2009),
http://www.state.gov/gldrl/rlslhrrpt/ (follow any of the year hyperlinks on the left hand
side; then follow the appropriate continent or country hyperlinks to reach each Botswana
report) (containing generally positive reports that get longer and include more criticism
over the years).
8. See Jacqueline S. Solway, Reaching the Limits of Universal Citizenship: 'Minority'
Struggles in Botswana, in ETHNICITY & DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 129 (Bruce Berman et al.
eds., 2004); Jacqueline Solway & Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo, Democracy in Process: Building
a Coalition to Achieve Political, Cultural and Linguistic Rights in Botswana, 38 CAN. J.
AFR. STUD. 603, 604 (2004); Jacqueline S. Solway, In the Eye of the Storm: The State and
Non-Violence in Southern Africa (Botswana), 76 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 485, 488 (2003)
[hereinafter Solway, Eye of the Storm]; Jacqueline Solway, Navigating the 'Neutral' State:
'Minority' Rights in Botswana, 28 J. S. AFR. STUD., Dec. 2002, at 711, 715 [hereinafter
Solway, Navigating].
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inspires people to imagine and seek new opportunities and to embrace a
sense of optimism.9
In Botswana, liberal ideology and practice, in combination with
enabling material conditions,' 0 laid the basis for a new political
imaginary. This new imaginary, ironically, gave rise to the minority
movement in which collective/group rights were sought in tandem with
individual rights. The minority movement's ultimate goal is to achieve
true individual rights, but it argues that the only way to realize this is
by first recognizing group rights. The movement is predicated upon
redress of injustices, some of which are enshrined in Botswana's
Constitution and statutes; these and others continue to manifest in
everyday practice. The movement is also founded on an imagination and
desire for a more emancipatory future in which all ethnic groups will act
on an even playing field in which their rights-material, political, and
cultural-will be enjoyed, respected, and enshrined in law and policy.
Contrary to a common perception promoted by the Botswana state,"
the country is not ethnically homogeneous. Minorities in Botswana
include all people of non-Tswana background, which is arguably well
over half the nation's population. In the past, minorities were not
recognized in the Constitution, and today their leaders still do not hold
permanent positions in the Ntlo ya Kgosi, formerly known as the House
9. Elizabeth Povinelli acknowledges liberalism's capacity to produce both cynicism
and optimism but credits "successful" liberalism with promoting optimism. Liberalism
offers its subjects a narrative that facilitates continued action despite realities and
circumstances that would otherwise promote a more pessimistic stance regarding the
outcome of their actions. ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, THE CUNNING RECOGNITION:
INDIGENOUS ALTERITIES AND THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM 155 (2002).
With respect to land claims, Povinelli observes that claimants are able to "protect
themselves through narrative devices, in the moment of discrimination ... [and] to believe
that this time they've gotten it right, that this time history will be ruptured." Id.
10. Botswana is the largest producer of gemstone quality diamonds in the world. Since
independence in 1966, it has experienced unprecedented growth. In addition, for most of
the years prior to the 2008 economic downturn, Botswana had one of the highest growth
rates in per capita income in the world. Background Note: Botswana, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/1830.htm (last updated September 17, 2010). From being
among the poorest countries in the world at independence in 1966, it is now classed as an
Upper Middle Income Country by the World Bank and its GDP per capita (2009) was USD
5,965. Botswana I Data, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana
("GDP per capita (current US$)" indicator can be found by searching for that term using
the indicator search function) (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
11. Richard Werbner speaks of a "One Nation Consensus" that emerged in the early
independence years. While national leaders acknowledged difference, their goal for the
nation was assimilation into Tswanadom. WERBNER, supra note 6, at 38-39. This goal was
manifest in language policy, the formation of the House of Chiefs, demarcation of tribal
territories, and other practices that all reinforced the hegemony of the Tswana and the
marginalization of non-Tswana citizens.
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of Chiefs, the upper house of Parliament.12 These minorities are people
who, in the past, were brought either voluntarily or by compulsion into
the orbit of Tswana chiefdoms where they enjoyed secondary or
servitude status.13 Their secondary status is enshrined in various post-
colonial government statutes pertaining to land, local governance, and
official language status.
Minorities also experience discrimination and marginalization in a
myriad of everyday forms.'4 The home areas of most minority groups
exhibit some of the highest poverty indicators in the country.15
Geographically, minority home areas tend to be considered remote,
lacking in services and employment opportunities. 16 However,
remoteness is a historical outcome, a consequence of power, not a
natural geographic fact. Socially and politically, minority groups were in
the past, and are still in some instances today, jural minors, unable to
speak in public assemblies dominated by the Tswana. In the past, their
official representation needed to be through a Tswana intermediary and
today, while legally in a position to speak, many lack a sense of
entitlement that would enable them easily to do so. Still today, for
minority groups living within the boundaries of a former tribal
12. Eight Tswana groups, referred to as "tribes" in the Constitution, and whose
territories were tribal reserves at various points in colonial times, enjoy permanent
hereditary membership in the House of Chiefs, now Ntlo ya Dikgosi. At independence,
four additional chiefs were granted nonpermanent and elected positions in the House of
Chiefs. The latter represent districts that were Crown Lands prior to independence. Upon
passage of Bill No. 34 in 2005, the Constitution was amended to officially change the
House of Chiefs to the Ntlo ya Dikgosi, to expand its membership to thirty-seven but to
limit permanent membership to only the eight Tswana paramount chiefs that held
permanent membership previously. Memorandum from the Ditshwanelo: Bots. Ctr. for
Human Rights, Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2004 (Dec. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/bil.html. Press Release, Bots. Ctr. for Human Rights, Bill
Fails to Ensure Equal Recognition and Treatment of All Ethnic Groups (Apr. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/aprill8pres.html.
13. See generally K. Datta & A. Murray, The Rights of Minorities and Subject Peoples
in Botswana: A Historical Evaluation, in DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 58-74 (John Holm &
Patrick Molutsi eds., 1989).
14. For instance, the Tribal Land Act of 1970 established and named land boards after
the Tswana Tribes recognized in the Constitution. Tribal Land Act, 1970, c. 32:02, para.
3(1) (Bots.) (the names of the land boards can be found under the heading "First
Schedule"). Most of the tribal territories are multiethnic and other tribes residing within
the territory of a land board are subclassified under the tribe the territory is associated
with. This further fosters Tswana identity and association with land. See LYDIA NYATI-
RAMAHOBO, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT'L, MINORITY TRIBES IN BOTSWANA: THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION 3 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/496dcOc82.pdf.
15. See generally POVERTY STRATEGY UNIT, BOTS. GOv'T, BOTSWANA: ANNUAL POVERTY
MONITORING REPORT 06/07 (August 2007), available at http://www.sarpn.org.zal
documents/d0003017/index.php.
16. See Solway & Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 8, at 608.
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reserve,'7 their customary courts and other offices are subordinate to
those of the Tswana-dominated district capitals.18
Furthermore, in the past, minorities were forced to render tribute to
the dominant Tswana.19 In some cases this domination preceded
colonialism, but it was strengthened and institutionalized by
colonialism and indirect rule, which empowered Tswana chiefs and
drew boundaries that fixed minorities' legal and geographic positions
within Tswana chiefdoms. Some of the inequality was undone during
and after independence, but constitutional privileges enjoyed by the
eight principal tribes (all Tswana, particularly those with membership
in the Ntlo ya Kgosi and having official language status) have
remained, 20 despite the fact that in other respects, Botswana's
Constitution is a modernist document.
As political philosopher Will Kymlicka notes, a state like Botswana
that accords individual rights to all citizens "may appear to be 'neutral'
between the various national groups. But in fact it can (and often does)
systematically privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental
ways."21 The marginalization of minorities can occur as a result of, "for
example, the drawing of internal boundaries; the language of schools,
courts and government services; the choice of public holidays; and the
division of legislative power between central and local governments."22
It is evident that the dispositions of the politically dominant majority
tend to saturate the fabric of daily social, political, and cultural life. 23
17. The boundaries and numbers of the Tswana tribal reserves shifted during the
colonial period. Large stretches of land were designated by the British as Crown Lands;
however, the tribal reserves covered the most populous areas of the country.
18. Chieftainship Act, 1987, c. 41:01 (Bots.).
19. I. SCHAPERA & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THE TSWANA 20, 22, 31 (Kegan Paul Int'l 1991)
(1953).
20. English and Setswana (the Tswana language) remain the only official or national
languages in the country despite the government's stated intention in 1997 to change
existing policy. 124 PARL. DEB. (pt. 8) (Aug. 8, 1997) 157-93 (Bots.). The question was "put
and agreed to" on August 11. Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
21. Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity in the USA, in THE ETHNICITY READER 229, 231
(Montserrat Guibernau & John Rex eds., 1997); see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 2-3 (1996).
22. Kymlicka, supra note 21, at 231.
23. The 1982 Citizenship Act, before its amendment, was a case in point and aptly
illustrates how the majority's culture can be imposed on all. Not only did its prohibition on
women married to expatriates passing on their citizenship to their children violate the
universalistic basis of national Botswana citizenship, Human Rights Watch/Africa,
Botswana: Second Class Citizens: Discrimination Against Women Under Botswana's
Citizenship Act, Hum. Rts. Watch Women's Rts. Project, Sept. 1994, at 9-12,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reportsBOTSWANAO994.pdf, but it reflected the
patrilineal basis of Batswana 'tribal' culture. Not all groups in Botswana share patrilineal
ideology; for example many Bushmen, Yei, and Herero groups have other principles of
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Consequently, in Botswana "the ability of 'minorities' to enjoy the full
benefits of citizenship may be compromised."24
Minority status is manifested in a range of widely varying
exclusionary and discriminatory processes and practices. Some of the
more subjugated minorities, such as the Bushmen (Sarwa or San),25
experience stark material deprivation. 26 In their case, ethnic status is
largely homologous to class status. 27 While the Bushmen, the only non-
Bantu-speaking minority, have experienced some internal
differentiation, 28 few, if any, have found their way into the national
bourgeoisie. This is not the case for other former subject (current
minority) peoples. 29 The fact that many members of other minorities
descent. See, e.g., ALAN BARNARD, HUNTERS AND HERDERS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: A
COMPARATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE KHOISAN PEOPLES (1992) (discussing various
Bushmen descent systems). In 1993, the Citizenship Act was changed as a result of
lawfare.
24. Solway, Navigating, supra note 8, at 720.
25. Most Bushmen refer to themselves by a term unique to their own language, and
there are a great many languages spoken in southern Africa. Apart from these individual
group names, there are no terms in Bushmen languages that encompass all the various
groups. All the terms commonly deployed such as Bushmen, San, and Basarwa (in
Botswana only) more or less mean the same thing and are derogatory and externally
ascribed. However, recent politicization appears to have changed this. While still nascent
and not necessarily an irreversible or universal trend, a more inclusive sense of identity
appears to be emerging in Bushmen culture. See Jacqueline Solway, Human Rights and
NGO Wrongs' Conflict Diamonds, Culture Wars and the 'Bushman Question', 79 AFR.: J.
INT'L AFR. INST. 321, 321 n.1 (2009) [hereinafter Solway, Conflict Diamonds]. This
phenomenon is also happening in similar cultures around the world. Cf., e.g., RICHARD
SALISBURY, A HOMELAND FOR THE CREE 7 (1986) ("The Cree insist that the biggest change
since 1971 is a stronger feeling of identity as Cree, for in 1971 they rarely used the word,
and thought of themselves as members of individual bands."). This is reflected in the fact
that some Bushmen are beginning to embrace and thus to destigmatize both the
appellations of Bushmen and San. Personal communication with Megan Biesele at
numerous anthropology conferences over the preceding two decades and based on my own
observation and fieldwork with Bushmen in Botswana in the last two decades.
26. See generally James Suzman, Legal Assistance Center (LAC), AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE REGIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE SAN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (2001),
available at http://www.lac.org.nalprojects/lead/Pdf/sanintro.pdf.
27. Edwin N. Wilmsen & Rainer Vossen, Labour, Language and Power in the
Construction of Ethnicity in Botswana, 10 CRITIQUE ANTHROPOLOGY 7, 7 (1990).
28. E. WILMSEN, LAND FILLED WITH FLIES 52-61 (1989) (discussing the existence of
"class" relations among rural, tribal societies).
29. For example, there are members of Parliament from several of the groups that,
according to Schapera's classification, were "serfs" in the past (e.g., Kgalagadi, Yei,
Tswapong). I. SCHAPERA, THE TSWANA 37 (1953). However, there are no Bushmen MPs. As
mentioned earlier, the home areas of many former "serf' peoples remain "remote" and
poverty stricken. See Solway & Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 8, at 608. "Remote," it should
be noted here, denotes geographical as well as social and moral distance from Tswana
centers.
217
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
have achieved middle class and professional status is a testimony to the
success of Botswana's process of bureaucratic rationalization. This
process has promoted universal education, appointment to office based
on merit (within limits), and has enabled direct access to government
services, thereby dismantling patron-client relations, especially
interethnic ones. 30 Such minority elites provide essential leadership in
minority activism, and they also stand as exemplars that can provide
empirical proof to their rural compatriots that, despite what they had
been led to believe by their former Tswana overlords, they and their
groups are as talented and deserving as any other. Therefore, and
paradoxically, the fruits of liberal success based on individual rights and
recognition provide a subjective basis for rethinking group rights and
recognition.
Liberalism's success in Botswana can also be measured by the
mutual understanding between the Bantu-speaking minority groups
and Botswana's dominant society and state. Such "success" is also a
consequence of Tswana hegemony and forced assimilation. For instance,
the Yei people, despite a diverse background, were able to "read" the
dominant culture and law and conduct themselves in a manner
commensurate with the dominant culture.31 Mutual legibility facilitated
the efficacy of their organization and legal case, which will be discussed
below. Liberalism's limits are apparent in the Bushmen's largely
unsuccessful capacity to do the same, thus leaving the space of
contestation with the state open for others to take the lead in working
on the Bushmen's behalf.
I. LAWFARE AND MINORITY RIGHTS
Lawfare is not new in Botswana. The Tswana have long been a
litigious people who have repeatedly brought cases to the chiefs court.32
Citizens are familiar with customary law, 33 and appeals to external
judicial authorities have deep roots, although the scale, scope, and
frequency have expanded geometrically in recent decades.34 Yet, the
degree to which appeal has included distant and often unknown
30. Cf., e.g., Patrick Heller, Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from
India, 52 WORLD POL. 484, 489, 493-502 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Solway, Eye of the Storm, supra note 8, at 491-92.
32. See generally I. SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM 279-300
(Neville Rubin & Eugene Cotran eds., 2d ed., new impression 1970) (describing the
customary court system and procedures of the Tswana).
33. Preferably called "African jurisprudence." John Comaroff, Remarks at the Indiana
University Maurer School of Law Symposium: Human Rights, Legal Systems and
Customary Cultures Across the Global South (Apr. 9, 2010).
34. See generally Solway & Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 8.
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external authorities and actors in the legal process is now
unprecedented.35
Lawfare has proven central to the minority rights movements in
Botswana for both Bushmen and the Bantu-speaking minorities,
although in different forms and with different results. These two
contrasting sets of cases illustrate the impact, efficacy, and limits of
lawfare. In every instance, lawfare has entailed an ever-increasing
involvement with international actors, including various United
Nations' bodies, covenants, and treaties, as well as NGOs. Lawfare has
also at times traversed the lines between legal traditions.
I will begin by considering Bantu-speaking minority activism and
turn later to a Bushman example. Bantu-speaking groups' minority
activism is especially fascinating because the movements are entirely
grassroots in origin and do not entail external intervention or direction.
Eventually, many Bantu-speaking groups sought collaboration with
U.N. bodies, NGOs, and the state, but all initiative, original funds, and
leadership emanated from local peoples recognizing and seeking
solutions for self-identified problems.
II. POST-COLONIAL MINORITY RIGHTS, LAWFARE, AND "CULTURE"
Post-colonial minority discontent began in earnest in the late 1980s.
For example, in the western Kweneng district, the Bakgalagadi's
minority discontent first manifested itself through support of the
35. A fascinating case arose in the colonial period that entailed minority rights and
conflicting legal systems. The chief of the largest and most powerful Tswana chiefdom, the
Ngwato, ceded a portion of his land to the British that eventually became part of the
British South Africa Company. A subject people, the Birwa, resided on the land and were
allowed to remain subject to paying rent to the company. Eventually the British wanted
them out and in 1920 the Ngwato chief, Khama III, ordered a forced removal that was
degrading and violent. The Birwa, under chief Malema, claimed that as taxpayers on
British land, the chief had no jurisdiction over them. "Pared down to its central issue, the
case concerned two conflicting principles of rights to land. Did people gain access to land
by paying allegiance to a ruler or by paying taxes and rent to a landlord?" DIANE WYLIE, A
LITTLE GOD: THE TWILIGHT OF PATRIARCHY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN CHIEFDOM 149-55
(1990). The issue thus pits two legal systems against each other. Neither the chief nor the
British, whose colonial system of indirect rule through chiefs would be undermined, would
countenance such a claim. Malema's Birwa responded by hiring a South African lawyer
and attempting to launch a case. The British refused to hear the case and belittled both
the Birwa and the lawyer. While the Birwa lost their plea, the lawyer published reports
recounting the story of the Birwa's mistreatment at the hand of the Ngwato and the
British. Id. This is an early instance of the strategic use of the politics of shame in the
region and the first instance in the region of one African chief hiring a lawyer to plead its
case against another. Incidentally, the lawyer was Emanuel Gluckman, father of
anthropologist Max Gluckman. Richard Brown, Passages in Life of a White Anthropologist:
Max Gluckman in Northern Rhodesia, 20 J. AFR. HIST. 525, 528 (1979).
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opposition party in the mid-1980s. 36 The timing is significant because it
coincides with the period when Botswana experienced exponential
economic growth and when many minority individuals found valuable
positions in Botswana's expanding, largely urban, bourgeoisie.
Elsewhere, minority groups began to assert their rights earlier, and
these groups were later more concerted in their actions. The Yei, a
group originally from the Okavango delta in northwest Botswana, an
area that now includes some of the most important tourism destinations
in Botswana, are one such group. The delta is dominated by the
Tawana, a Tswana group that represents a small numerical minority of
the district but under whose chiefly authority all residents fall.
In the past, and to a lesser extent today, the Yei were called "Koba"
by their neighbors, a derogatory term that reflected the Yei's servile
status, legacy of tribute payment, and appropriation of their property. 37
The Yei, who comprise a substantial numeric majority in their district,
have a rich history of minority activism and separatism. In 1948, a
group of educated Yei elite demanded, via a petition to the colonial
government, concessions from the Tawana, including rights to land, to
have their own chiefs (which, in effect, would separate them from the
Tawana reserve), to have their own customary courts (dikgotla), and to
not have their property inherited after their death by the Tawana.38
They achieved the creation of their own dikgotla only.39
The Yei separatists' demands quieted, but their desires did not
disappear in the years after 1948 or through the first two decades of
independence. They were revived again in the mid-1980s. While living
in the capital and establishing a career at the University of Botswana,
Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo (now Saleshando, a Yei, and currently Deputy
Vice Chancellor of the University of Botswana) spoke with a Yei elder
who had been involved in the 1948 petition. 40 As he explained the
36. See Jacqueline Solway, From Shame to Pride: Politicized Ethnicity in the Kalahari,
Botswana, 28 CAN. J. AFR. STuD. 254, 263-66 (1994). This is also based on my own
extensive anthropological research first carried out from 1977 through mid-1979 and
periodically since, most recently in 2010.
37. See Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo, From a Phone Call to the High Court: Wayeyi Visibility
and the Kamanakao Association's Campaign for Linguistic and Cultural Rights in
Botswana, 28 J. S. AFR. STuD. 685, 688, 694 (2002).
38. A. Murray, The Northwest, in THE BIRTH OF BOTSWANA 114-16 (F. Morton & J.
Ramsay eds., 1987).
39. Id. at 115.
40. Unless otherwise indicated, much of the remaining content in this section comes
from personal communications from 1998 through 2010 with Saleshando (formerly Lydia
Nyati-Ramahobo), one of the founders of Kamanakao and the current Deputy Vice
Chancellor of the University of Botswana, also a Professor of Education and holder of a
PhD in Applied Linguistics. In addition to close association with Saleshando, I have
attended Reteng, the coalition of minority groups, and other minority group meetings for
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history to her, Saleshando reflected and came to realize that, despite
two decades of independence, much remained the same.
This constituted an epiphanal experience in which her group's
invisibility and past and present injustices were thrown into relief. The
Yei remained subordinate and their language was disappearing as a
result of Tswana hegemony and the policy of assimilation. However, as
Saleshando recognized, assimilation was not a neutral or necessarily a
"natural" process, but rather a political one resulting from unequal
power relations. Shortly after, Saleshando began advocating for Yei
recognition. She was instrumental in forming the maverick group,
Kamanakao, which has led the struggle for minority rights in Botswana.
Kamanakao, which means "remnants" in the Yei language, aims to
restore, revive, preserve, and record the remnants of Yei culture and
language. The organization drafted a constitution and registered with
the government in 1995.41 Saleshando has always claimed that
Kamanakao is a cultural organization whose mandate is to promote Yei
culture. However, she acknowledges that to achieve this end, it is
necessary to fight on political and economic grounds first.
While translating the Bible into Yei, collecting folktales, holding
meetings, and organizing events in the Okavango, the Yei decided it
was time to install their own paramount chief. This action would
reinforce their integrity as a group, further valorize their culture, and
allow them benefits that other recognized tribes enjoyed, such as mother
tongue education at the primary level and the right to develop the land
on which they lived. In addition, having their own paramount chief,
under whose authority other Yei chiefs and headmen would fall, would
enable them to present customary cases in their own language and to
obtain judgments that would be sensitive to their culture. For instance,
the Yei are historically matrilineal while the Tswana are patrilineal;
thus, inheritance cases should reflect this custom. In addition, land
ownership is critical, as the area is rich in tourist and agricultural
potential that is either being squandered or left to others to exploit,
especially the Tawana. According to Saleshando, economic development
follows cultural recognition.42
In April 1999, after extensive consultation among themselves, the
Yei installed their Paramount Chief in an elaborate ceremony. When
they informed the government that they wished to have their Chief
ten years, have become acquainted with many members, and have learned a great deal
from them.
41. About Us, KAMANAKAO Ass'N, http://kamanakao.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
42. Cf. Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a
'Post-Socialist'Age, 121 NEW LEFT REv. 68, 73 (1995) ("Redistributive remedies generally
presuppose an underlying conception of [cultural] recognition.").
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admitted to the House of Chiefs, they were rebuffed on the basis that
they were not one of the eight tribes listed in the Constitution. They
were told to submit their concerns to the Tawana chief as technically
they fell under his jurisdiction. This was especially irksome, considering
one of the more important reasons for installing a chief was to
dismantle Tawana rule over the Yei.
Since the Yei did not recognize the Tawana chief as theirs, the Yei
hired a lawyer to bring a case against the government. 43 Even though
Kamanakao, the newly installed chief, and a Yei elder were the
applicants, the case was, in essence, brought forward on behalf of all
minority groups in the country. The group's main argument centered on
Sections 3 and 15 of the Constitution, which proscribed discrimination
on many grounds, including ethnicity.44 Therefore, the complaint argued
that Sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution, which listed the eight
Tswana tribes able to have permanent seats in the House of Chiefs, as
well as certain statutes and acts, such as the Chieftaincy Act 45 and the
Tribal Territories Act,46 were discriminatory and thus unconstitutional.
Frightened by the magnitude of the case and its wide-ranging
implications, including the challenge to broader Tswana hegemony, the
government repeatedly postponed hearing the case.
In 2000, Saleshando, frustrated and not knowing where else to turn,
wrote a letter on behalf of the group to Kofi Annan, then Secretary
General of the United Nations. Her letter began, "Dear Father Annan."
Saleshando then proceeded to outline the Yei's case and provide
historical context. This was the beginning of her and Kamanakao's
engagement with a vast array of U.N. bodies, conventions, and
declarations, and international human rights NGOs. Annan's office
referred the letter to Botswana's ambassador to the United Nations. The
office also referred Kamanakao to the Committee on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to which Botswana is a
signatory. Kamanakao was invited to Geneva to submit a shadow
report, the results of which prompted the United Nations to cite human
rights violations on the part of Botswana.
43. Kamanakao v. Attorney-Gen., 2002 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. 35 (2001) (High Ct.)
(Bots.), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.zaltest/index.php/browse-by-country/botswanal
216-botswana-kamanakao-and-others-v-attorney-general-and-another-2002-ahrlr-35-
bwhc-2001.html.
44. Id. ? 8.1(a).
45. Chieftainship Act, 1987, c. 41:01 (Bots.). The challenged statute is available at
http://www.gov.bw/Global/MLGIActs/Chieftainship.pdf.
46. Tribal Territories Act, 1970, c. 32:03 (Bots.). Since the challenge, the statute has




This was one of the first of many instances in which the politics of
shame47 was deployed against Botswana, whose leaders cherished their
hitherto stellar human rights record. When Saleshando showed the
letter to Annan to me, she giggled at her former naivet6. Since then,
Reteng, the Coalition of Minority Groups that formed in the wake of
Kamanakao's actions, has submitted numerous shadow reports to
various U.N. bodies. Further, Saleshando has attended workshops run
by the Minority Rights Group in Geneva, and she claims to know every
loophole in the system through which minority groups can hold the
government accountable.
Many months later the case was still being delayed, and the
President announced the formation of the Balopi Commission. The
mandate of the Commission was to seek the nation's opinion regarding
whether the sections, of the Constitution naming the tribes that could
participate in the House of Chiefs were discriminatory, along with an
opinion on the efficacy and organization of the House of Chiefs. 48 The
Balopi Commission toured the country and minority voices
overwhelmingly revealed sentiments of oppression, while most of the
Tswana supported -the status quo and, more quietly, revealed
resentment over their threatened status.4 9 In 2001, after U.N.
involvement, the Botswana High Court finally heard the Kamanakao
case and ruled that the Constitution is self-protected and cannot be
deemed to be internally contradictory.50 However, the court did
determine that the Chieftaincy Act was discriminatory and advised that
the Constitution should be rendered tribally neutral with no individual
47. RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM 179 (2003) (defining the politics of
shame as "the effort to influence a decision or policy through dissemination of information
to an audience that is a source of political power, information that exposes the
inappropriateness, harm, or illegality of a course of action").
48. Report of the Presidential Comm'n of Inquiry into Sections 77, 78, and 79 of the
Constitution, at 9 (2000) (Bots.).
49. The Balopi Commission coincided with the inauguration of BTV in 2000,
Botswana's first and only television network. It aired the proceedings of the Balopi
Commission. This, along with print media and radio coverage, resulted in the Balopi
Commission saturating the public sphere. The degree of discussion and debate that
occurred in all sectors of society was virtually unprecedented, such that consciousness of
the minority issue was extremely intense. Many tell me that had the Balopi Commission
occurred many years later, it might not have received the same media attention. BTV was
brand new and experimental, with rules and practices not fully formulated. It is a state-
owned entity and state media have been less sympathetic to minority issues and,
generally, offered less coverage than the private media.
50. Kamanakao, 2002 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. at 1 28 (2001) (High Ct.) (Bots.).
Botswana's constitution has a provision within it that one part cannot be judged or taken
to violate another part.
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groups mentioned. 51 In late 2001, the President issued a draft White
Paper on the issue in which he proposed a greatly expanded and
inclusive House of Chiefs, to be renamed Ntlo ya Kgosi (Tswana for
House of Chiefs), where all chiefs would be elected every five years.
Within days, after hostile reaction from the Tswana, the White Paper
was changed. The new name and expanded numbers remained, but the
superior status of the eight Tswana tribes was restored. These eight
tribes' chiefs retained paramount and permanent status, while all
others were to be elected every five years.
While the overall result was seen as an unprecedented victory for
minorities, the sweetness of success was muted by a final outcome that
retained the existing power relations. However, it was not an empty
victory; the House of Chiefs was renamed and became more inclusive
with new members from minority groups as a consequence of changes to
the Chieftaincy Act. 52 More importantly, the result gave minorities a
new confidence and led to a greater appreciation and recognition of
ethnic diversity. But limits remain, and these will be discussed below.
Ironically, the Yei deployed civil law to attain access to their right to
enjoy customary law. However, the stakes, as they knew well, were
much greater than their right to either customary law or the ability to
have their own chief. While the government gave lip service to tribal
equality in the past, this was the first time the government acted to
alter the law and the institutionalization of at least certain aspects of
tribal inequality. Without Kamanakao's lawfare and appeal to the
United Nations, it is unlikely that the government would have acted.
The meta-goal of Kamanakao and Reteng was equal recognition for the
languages and culture of all groups, and the High Court's decision was a
strong first step in that direction.
III. THE BUSHMEN AND THE CENTRAL KALAHARI GAME RESERVE CASE
The Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) case illustrates
another example of lawfare and also demonstrates lawfare's limits. 53
The High Court's 2006 judgment, to be discussed below, is clear, but its
interpretation and implementation remain highly contested, and the
success of its long-term outcomes are more uncertain than the
51. Id. T 42, 52.
52. See supra note 12.
53. See generally Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25 (discussing the events
leading up to the CKGR case and the case's positive and negative outcomes). The CKGR
case was the longest running and most expensive case in Botswana's history. Id. at 321.
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Kamanakao case. Many have written at length about this case, so only a
short background is necessary. 54
The CKGR case was filed by some Bushmen living on the reserve,
seeking to avoid relocation or the possibility of return to the CKGR for
some already relocated at the hands of the government. While the
CKGR case certainly has implications for all of Botswana's Bushmen, it
was launched by and on behalf of a very small number of them.
Bushmen are scattered across Botswana, but a majority reside in the
central and western parts of the country. As of 2006, there were
approximately 50,000 Bushmen in Botswana, including 2,000 from the
CKGR,65 in a country with a total population of 2,029,307.56 Such
figures must be taken with caution,5 7 but they do provide some sense of
proportion. This is important to note because the inordinate media
attention given to the case, much of it influenced or sponsored by
Survival International (SI), a British-based NGO,68 gives the impression
that the case involved all Bushmen in Botswana.
The CKGR is over 52,000 square kilometers in size and was founded
in the late colonial period, in 1961. It was established both as a game
reserve and for the hunting and gathering populations residing within
its boundaries. 59 These populations mostly consisted of Bushmen, but
54. See, e.g., Robert K. Hitchcock & Diana Vinding, A Chronology of Major Events
Relating to the Central Kalahari Game Reserve II: An Update, 33 BOTS. NOTES & RECORDS
61 (2001); Sidsel Saugestad, San Development and Challenges in Development
Cooperation, in UPDATING THE SAN: IMAGE AND REALITY OF AN AFRICAN PEOPLE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 171, 174-80 (Robert K. Hitchcock et al. eds., Nat'l Museum of Ethnology
(Osaka, Japan), Senri Ethnological Studies Ser. No. 70, 2006); Solway, Conflict Diamonds,
supra note 25 (discussing the role of NGO Survival International in the CKGR case);
James Suzman, Kalahari Conundrums: Relocation, Resistance and International Support
in the Central Kalahari Botswana, BEFORE FARMING, no. 2002/34,
http://www.waspjournals.com/journals/beforefarming/journal_20023_4/news/survival.pdf.
beforefarming/journal_20023_4/news/survival.pdf; Julie J. Taylor, Celebrating San Victory
Too Soon?: Reflections on the Outcome of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve Case, 23
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 3; Robert Hitchcock & Megan Biesele, Seeking Social
Justice: The Politics of Land and Resource Rights in the Central Kalahari, Botswana
(2006) (paper prepared for the American Anthropological Meetings) (on file with author).
55. Robert K. Hitchcock, Int'l Work Grp. for Indigenous Affairs, Botswana, in THE
INDIGENOUS WORLD 2007 539, 539-40 (Sille Stidsen et al. eds., 2007).
56. Botswana, CIA - THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (click "People") (last updated Nov.16, 2010).
57. It is difficult to obtain these figures as the Census does not ask for ethnic origin.
Furthermore, not all Bushmen would self-identify as such; some might mention their own
linguistic group, or because of the stigma of the identity, call themselves something else.
Moreover, ethnicity is situational and many people have multiple identities that can be
evoked depending on the circumstance.
58. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 322-24.
59. Id. at 326.
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also included some Kgalagadi. Kgalagadi numbers increased over time,
especially as the Botswana government increased services inside the
reserve and enclosed grazing land outside the reserve, a move that
favored the nation's elite at the expense of the poorer Bushmen and
Kgalagadi on the reserve's borders.60
After a number of concerns were raised in the early 1980s regarding
the conditions in the reserve, the government commissioned a report in
1985 that concluded the Bushmen's and Kgalagadi's lifestyle in the
reserve had become incompatible with the reserve's status as a game
reserve.61 The report recommended relocating the Bushmen and
Kgalagadi to villages outside the reserve.62 By this time, very few CKGR
Bushmen were living as full-time hunter-gatherers; most had a mixed
livelihood strategy of hunting (often on horseback and with guns),
gathering, and small-scale agro-pastoralism, including the keeping of
domestic animals.63 The Bushmen were also highly dependent on
government services and transfers. Yet, many of these government
services were deemed too expensive and difficult to provide in the
reserve given the poor infrastructure and scattered population. Despite
the resources formerly available in the CKGR and still available to
Bushmen in many other parts of the country, it is indisputable that the
Bushmen were, and remain, the most impoverished, disempowered,
inarticulate, and unorganized group in Botswana.
This history of oppression long predates the founding of Botswana
and the imposition of colonial rule, and the legacy of such oppression is
difficult to undo. One consequence has been a conspicuous absence of
grassroots organizations and activism, unlike the minority groups that
formed Reteng. Thus, other groups and individuals have taken to
representing the Bushmen. Those people not only speak in the
60. See also Michael Taylor, Int'l Land Coal., CBNRM and Pastoral Development in
Botswana: Implications for San Land Rights 6, 15-16 (Dec. 1, 2006) (paper prepared for
the Workshop on Environment, Identity and Community Based Natural Resource
Management: Experiences of the San in Southern Africa at Oxford University), available
at http://www.landcoalition.org/pdf/ev06 oxford-lec.pdf (explaining how land tenure
reforms over the last century have favored the nation's elite and placed marginalized
groups on smaller tracts of land).
61. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 327.
62. Id.
63. KUELA KIEMA, TEARS FOR MY LAND: A SOcIAL HISTORY OF THE KUA OF THE
CENTRAL KALAHARI GAME RESERVE, TC'AMNQOO 81 (2010) (claiming that Bushmen, Kua
in his language, in the CKGR practiced agriculture, pastoralism and hunted on horseback
with guns long before the 1980s and that his own father owned a rifle prior to 1961 when
the CKGR was established). Kiema, a native of the CKGR, argues that colonial planners
researched the western CKGR Bushmen while ignoring the larger population in the rest of
the reserve, who unlike the small western portion, had relied on a mixed livelihood
strategy before 1961. Id.
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Bushmen's place but often speak for as opposed to with them.64 Gordon
notes that the Bushmen's lack of voice, especially in the past, is
"perhaps the most damning evidence of their powerlessness." 65 Their
powerlessness opens up spaces for others to take the lead. In this case,
the government set its agenda for Bushmen improvement and a whole
series of NGOs, mostly from outside of the country, set up agendas as
well. The dearth of grassroots organizations distinguishes the Bushmen
case from the Kamanakao case and contributes to its differing outcomes.
The CKGR relocations began in 1997, but what is often silenced by
the international media coverage and international NGO rhetoric
around this case is that the relocation of the CKGR Bushmen, by that
time, was part of what had become a nationwide strategy of Bushmen
development. In central and western Botswana, dozens of new villages
were established and outfitted with considerable infrastructure for
Bushmen living in the region. The Bushmen were offered generous
packages, including livestock, agricultural implements, money, and
64. See, e.g., SIDSEL SAUGESTAD, THE INCONVENIENT INDIGENOUs: REMOTE AREA
DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA, DONOR ASSISTANCE, AND THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE
KALAHARI 107 (2001); Dorothy L. Hodgson, Precarious Alliances: The Cultural Politics and
Structural Predicaments of the Indigenous Rights Movement in Tanzania, 104 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1086, 1094 (2002) (discussing how the decisions by INGOs to link local
causes to the global indigenous movement creates the risk of assuming that peoples
labeled as "indigenous" share common interests and a common identity, which can lead to
volatile and splintering debates). Certainly Bushman leaders have emerged, but the
difference between Reteng and its constituent groups, all of which are grassroots
initiatives founded by local people with no or very little external support, and the
Bushman groups that have such substantial NGO and donor involvement, is striking. In
the 1990s John Hardbattle proved an effective leader for the First Peoples of the Kalahari
(FPK). Unfortunately, his premature death in 1996 ended his career. Roy Sesana, his FPK
colleague, remains active but his leadership qualities are questionable. For excellent
discussions of Bushman activism, compare SAUGESTAD, supra (discussing how Bushmen
become a "muted group" because they are perceived as not being willing to participate in
development programs and present their own case); Megan Biesele, The Kalahari Peoples
Fund: The Activist Legacy of the Harvard Kalahari Research Group, in THE POLITICS OF
EGALITARIANISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 131, 138-39 (Jacqueline Solway ed., 2006)
(highlighting the Julhoansi's efforts to obtain land rights, political representation, and
resources); Mathias Guenther, Contemporary Bushman Art, Identity Politics, and
Primitive Discourse, in THE POLITICS OF EGALITARIANISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra,
at 159 (arguing that the San people became more politically engaged when their art made
a more prominent appearance in the 1990s); Robert Hitchcock, Land, Livestock, and
Leadership Among the Ju/hoansi San of North-Western Botswana, in THE POLITICS OF
EGALITARIANISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 149 (examining the ethnographic and
political positions of the Julhoansi San of Botswana, focusing mainly on how they have
been active in regaining land and resource rights).
65. ROBERT J. GORDON, THE BUSHMAN MYTH 8 (1992).
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other perks to relocate to the new villages where they were provided
with homesteads and much more.66
I observed this process on a field trip in 1998, in an area close to the
CKGR where I have conducted extensive research. At that time the local
Bushmen were considering the invitation to relocate. I have since
visited several of the new settlements. These new settlements, like
everywhere, are not without problems, but they are not without benefits
either. Many of the Bushmen with whom I spoke are proud of their new
resources and relieved to no longer be in degrading patron-client
relations. To overgeneralize, they also have a new sense of pride. I
heard more of their own languages spoken than on past visits to the
region. Unfortunately, it could now be argued that the Bushmen are
clients of the state, subject to paternalism and discrimination, and it
would be difficult to counter this.
In contrast, the CKGR relocations were very poorly handled from
the beginning. The Bushmen were given conflicting reasons for the
move; one minister told them it was because of diamond finds, another
said it was for game conservation and tourism development, and yet
another claimed it was to provide them with the opportunity to develop
and enjoy the fruits of modernity. The lack of a consistent message and
lack of respect shown to the CKGR residents reflects the government's
condescension toward them.
There are at least two key differences between the CKGR Bushmen
relocations and other Bushmen relocations. First, the other relocations
were voluntary, such as the one in the region where I worked, and
indeed, not all Bushmen chose to move. On the contrary, the CKGR
Bushmen were forced to leave in three waves, each wave more coercive
than the previous.67 Second, the CKGR Bushmen had been in scattered
settlements and had little experience living with their new neighbors,
unlike the Bushmen in most of the new villages.
As pressure on the CKGR residents to relocate increased in the late
1990s, the CKGR residents worked with a local NGO negotiating team
as well as the 1Iinistry of Environment, Wildlife, and National Parks to
produce a management plan that would allow the CKGR to be divided
for mixed use into three zones: one for the residents, one for tourism,
and a third for potential mining. However, negotiations with the
government stopped abruptly in 2002, and the government hardened
their position on the relocations.68 At that time, the CKGR Bushmen,
66. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 329.
67. See Hitchcock & Vinding, supra note 54, at 63, 68 (describing relocations occurring
in May-June 1997 and Winter 2001-2002).
68. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 328. I refer to the government
and the state here as if there were unanimity in opinion. That was and is not the case. For
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largely represented by the FPK, and with the support of a local NGO,
Ditshwanelo, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, launched a
lawsuit against the government on the removals, but the suit was poorly
planned and dismissed on technical grounds.6 9 By this point, the
government was in a media battle with SI due to a high profile and
relatively effective media campaign that implicated Botswana in the
trade of blood diamonds. 70 In addition, as the local negotiating team's
efforts were overtaken by outside NGOs, appeals to supranational law
also changed. For instance, the outside NGOs expected Botswana to be
accountable to international conventions to which it had not been a
signatory, such as the International Labour Organisation's Convention
169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the U.N. Draft Declaration
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.71 International law, unless
domesticated into local law, remains persuasive but nonbinding.
However, as evidenced by the Kamanakao case, Botswana is attentive
to its international obligations. As will be seen below, this perceived
attack on Botswana's image, which was largely fostered by outsiders
peddling untruths, the rogue use of international law, and the
challenges to Botswana's sovereignty contributed to the ambiguities in
the outcome of this case.
The CKGR Bushmen and FPK returned to court in 2004. This time,
SI and its collaborators ran and funded the case, and provided the
services of a British lawyer who defended the case. The case was
decided in December 2006.72 The judgment by the High Court stated
that although the Bushmen had been inadequately consulted, they had
been adequately compensated according to the rules specified in Section
8 of the Constitution, which sets out procedures for moving people if
deemed for the public good.73 Like the judgment in the Kamanakao case,
this judgment affirmed aspects of Botswana's democracy by highlighting
the independence of the judicial branch from the executive. However,
instance, the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife, and National Parks' 2002 plan was
overridden by the Ministry of Local Government. Other high level civil servants and
members of the executive branch also had differing opinions, but in this paper I highlight
the voices that prevailed and do not have space to discuss all the discussions along the
way that may have affected outcomes and may still do so.
69. See Hitchcock & Vinding, supra note 54, at 69-71. Sidsel Saugestad, 'Improving
Their Lives.' State Policies and San Resistance in Botswana, BEFORE FARMING, no.
2005/4, at 1, 1-10, n.3 (2005).
70. See Suzman, supra note 54, at 4-7.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Sesana v. Attorney-Gen., 2006 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. 183 (2006) (High Ct.)
(Bots.), available at http://www.survivalinternational.org/files/news/ruing.doc.
73. Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 321 n.2 (analyzing the
constitutionality of Sesana, 2006 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. at 1 55).
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the CKGR case also points to the limitations of lawfare by illustrating
how the implementation of a judgment by an unsympathetic executive,
in this case the Attorney General, can shape the eventual outcome. The
state interpreted the judgment in the most stringent manner, allowing
only the 189 remaining applicants and their minor children to return
unimpeded to the reserve and provided them with no services, including
water, except that which could be brought in. 74 The State's stance
stemmed from the ruling that the Bushmen had been adequately
compensated.75
To a significant extent, SI and its collaborators planted the seeds for
the CKGR judgment and the Attorney General's implementation
statement. SI portrayed the CKGR Bushmen repeatedly as "among the
last Bushmen anywhere to be living self-sufficiently by hunting and
gathering on their own ancestral land."7 6 This is reiterated in the SI's
2007 shadow report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.77
Utilizing this portrayal, SI drew upon an image of the noble savage that
tapped into a deep Euro-romanticism. This helped SI raise funds but did
not constitute an accurate portrayal of reality. Ii the end, SI and the
FPK got just what was implicit in their propaganda-the CKGR
Bushmen's right to return to the reserve and to hunt and gather as
"they have always done."7 8 Of course, the CKGR Bushmen had not lived
as autonomous hunter-gatherers for decades, and within days of the
judgment, they were arguing for a restoration of services either by the
government, which refused, or to be funded by very willing donors.79
In a way, the case was a triumph for the Bushmen, Botswana, and
indigenous rights due to the attention that was paid to the Bushmen's
74. See Statement, Atlhalia Molokomme, Att'y Gen. of Bots., Outcome of the Case of
Roy Sesana and Others Vs. the Attorney General, 2 (Dec. 14, 2006) [hereinafter
Molokomme].
75. Sesana, 2006 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. at 1 53.
76. E.g., Democracy Now: The War and Peace Report, Diamond Giant De Beers Opens
First U.S. Store Amid Protests Over Eviction of Bushman in Botswana (radio program
broadcast June 23, 2005), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/6/23/diamond
giant-de beers.opensfirst.
77. Report from Survival International to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, 1 (May
25, 2007) ("The Gana, Gwi and Tsila are part of the group of tribes known as 'Bushmen'
who are among the earliest inhabitants of southern Africa. They are probably the last
Bushmen living self-sufficiently."), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrc/docs/ngos/survivalint.pdf [hereinafter HRC Report].
78. Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 322.
79. See HRC Report, supra note 77, at 2; see also Molokomrtie, supra note 74, at 2. The
only part of the judgment where the government can be specifically faulted for not abiding
is the directive to issue special game licenses that would allow the Bushmen to hunt by




plight and because the Bushmen won most of the lawsuit. Yet, the state
could have been more magnanimous in its interpretation of the
judgment, but there was nothing compelling it to do so. Indeed, in 2010,
with SI's support, the CKGR Bushmen launched another lawsuit, this
time for permission to drill a borehole for their use in the CKGR.80 The
Court held against the Bushmen in a decision on July 21, 2010, where
the judge argued that the CKGR Bushmen should have considered this
in their first case.81 The plea for services seemed in the court's view to
be "an afterthought."82 In all, what was heralded as a triumph turned
out to be more hollow than it first appeared, at least in terms of its
professed objectives of enabling the Bushmen to return to live in the
CKGR.
IV. LAWFARE IN ACTION
According to Saleshando, the head of Kamanakao and Reteng,
lawfare is the only way to go. Lawfare is a way of seeking justice and
peace, not war; it is an affirmation or expectation that the state is
tolerant and adheres to the rule of law. Without it, the state will not be
moved to act and rights will remain unfulfilled. In Saleshando's words,
if a child is angry, he or she can trash his or her mother's house.
Alternatively, the child can assume that his or her mother is just and
loving and that the mother will listen to the child's concerns without
fear of retribution.8 3 On this basis, Kamanakao has utilized lawfare to
good effect; its campaign has been peaceful and lawful and, therefore,
stands in contrast to the expression of ethnic discontent in many other
parts of the world. Of course, this also speaks to the ethos of governance
and accountability prevalent in Botswana. However, despite
Kamanakao's considerable degree of success, the organization's ultimate
goal for recognition of its groups and languages is not yet fully realized.
Nonetheless, their campaign has produced results, both with respect
to direct action in terms of changes in the country's laws and
institutions and, more subtly, with respect to public attitudes. For
instance, in 2006, residents of a small island in the Okavango Delta
were asked by the government to relocate.84 Without turning to their
urban leaders for advice, they refused the government's request and the




83. This is based on an extensive interview in Botswana with Saleshando on March 10,
2010.
84. Personal communication with Saleshando and others, March 2010.
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relocation was cancelled. Twenty years ago, they would have been
cowed, quiet and accepting. Another example of the campaign's success
comes from a case a few years ago in which the acting Kwena (Tswana
group) chief visited a Kgalagadi (former subject people) village and took
a goat as if it were the old days, when Kwena chiefs could take
Kgalagadi goods as sehuba (tribute) without asking. The goat's owner
called the police and the Kwena chief is now serving a five-year prison
term for stock theft. The sentence may have been more lenient had the
chief negotiated, but he refused to apologize to his batlhanka (servants)
or to admit his guilt.8 5
Several people in the country, from many walks of life, were initially
outraged about the chiefs actions but they are now satisfied with the
judgment. They are very proud of this victory and attribute the
reporting of the crime, as well as the outcome, to the recent minority
activism. This case is an example of how circumstances have changed
for minorities since the Balopi Commission, which was held primarily as
a result of Kamanakao's first case. These examples, plus many others,
including for instance, the use of minority languages in urban areas (a
practice that would not have occurred fifteen years ago), attest to the
increased levels of confidence and pride on the part of minorities. In
addition, Tswana attitudes have also changed to a considerable extent.
As one Tswana woman in the Department of Culture said, "I could
marry a Kgalagadi now." Of course, not all Tswana share the same
magnanimous feelings.
Since filing the initial lawsuit, Kamanakao and Reteng have become
increasingly involved with various U.N. bodies and supportive NGOs.
Although the initial lawsuit was submitted prior to their involvement
with, and knowledge of, international bodies and covenants, their
appeal to the United Nations, eventually channeled through CERD, had
a significant impact on the ultimate trial results. Saleshando claims
that the use of the broad U.N. scaffolding of conventions and treaties
has only amplified and strengthened, but not altered, their case or their
language. 86 Certainly in their external dealings, minorities have become
far savvier with the United Nations and other supranational discourse
since the letter sent ten years ago to "Father Annan." But, even if they
are now increasingly couched in terms of, and in reference to,
international protocols, their message and goals remain remarkably the
85. Isaiah Morewagae, Kgosikwena Sebele 'Stock Theft' Judgment Today, MMEGI (June
26, 2009), http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=30&dir-2010/January/Tuesday26;
Keonee Kealeboga, High Court Increases Kgosikwena Sentence, DAILYNEWS (May 18,
2010), http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/.
86. Personal communication, Saleshando, Botswana, March 2010.
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same.87 Kamanakao, for instance, lodged another case with regard to
the constitutional and statutory laws pertaining to chieftaincy and land,
this time with the African Commission on Human Rights, to which
Botswana is a signatory.8 8 In 2008, prior to the case being heard, the
government offered the Yei a five-year elected position in the Ntlo ya
Kgosi.89
However, and perhaps inevitably, these groups have increasingly
become institutionalized and professionalized, especially Reteng.90
Reteng maintains an office and office staff, meets regularly, applies for
funds to state organs and international donors, sponsors events and
festivals, creates orthographies for minority languages, translates
stories and the Bible, and creates multilingual calendars, to name but a
few. Further, the group maintains an active information campaign by
submitting articles to local papers and reports to international and local
institutions.
An important sphere in which both state and global discourses and
practices have impacted Reteng, and less so Kamankao, is in the realm
of "culture." While Reteng and Kamanakao argue that their
organizations are cultural, and indeed they are, culture has always been
for them inseparable from power relations. The right to enjoy one's
culture is a consequence of power just as economic and political
empowerment are a consequence of cultural recognition. However,
liberal global discourses of essentialized culture(s), combined with state
intervention to direct the expression and "experience" of culture in a
neoliberal world, are now profoundly shaping the nature of minority
activism, as will be more fully discussed below.
87. For instance, Saleshando's (then Nyati-Ramahobo) 2008 briefing to the Minority
Rights Group International states many of the same issues and desires with respect to
constitutional change that have defined Kamanakao's and Reteng's struggles from the
beginning although reference is made throughout to international conventions. Her
conclusion begins:
Scholars have argued that it is not indigenous or minority status or unique
cultures that mean minority groups warrant special attention .... Their
struggle is about livelihood, liberty, poverty alleviation, and access to
development and public services. Though the struggle by minority groups
is culturally oriented, its goal is economically and socially focused.
NYATI-RAMAHOBO, supra note 14, at 9. This is the same message, in almost the same
words, that was expressed to me in an interview with Saleshando in 1998.
88. See id. at 7.
89. Id.
90. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Rights, Religion and Community: Approaches to Violence
Against Women in the Context of Globalization, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER
249, 260-62 (Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005) (discussing nongovernmental organizations in
Hawaii and how these organizations moved away from their radical origins toward a more
mainstream and less confrontational perspective due to the pressures of neoliberal
globalization).
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The deployment of supranational law, conventions, and treaties in
the practice of lawfare and activism vary considerably between the
Kamanakao/Reteng and the CKGR cases, and these strategies both
influenced the procedure and outcome of these cases. Kamanakao and
Reteng have been careful to evoke and criticize the Botswana
government on conventions to which they have been a signatory and,
thus, have sought to hold the government accountable.9 ' This strategy
has worked to the organizations' benefit, given the government's
protective stance on its international reputation. Kamanakao and
Reteng's respectful approach has also given them credibility with the
government, which granted them a legitimacy not always afforded to
others.92 In addition, the fact that the actors were locally based, only
drawing on international resources at their discretion and in a
responsible manner, as opposed to being prompted by outside nonstate
actors, increased their legitimacy and the government's inclination to
take them seriously.93
Alternatively, SI and FPK have been less careful and, therefore, less
effective in obtaining their desired long-term results. This is evidenced
by the Attorney General's narrow interpretation and implementation
plan of the judgment.94 SI and FPK showed little respect or regard for
Botswana's own standing vis A vis international conventions and chose
to condemn the country for contravening covenants that it had not
signed. The groups' stinging media campaign engaged in falsities as
well as extreme hyperbole. For instance, Botswana was accused of
genocide and trafficking in blood diamonds.9 5 Thus, they did not use
lawfare in the way Kamanakao did. Instead of displaying trust or
assuming "a mother's love and tolerance,"96 SI and FPK used lawfare in
a spiteful attempt to damage Botswana's reputation and economy
through the blood diamond campaign. This angered and alienated the
state, which reacted accordingly.
In addition, foreign actors played an overwhelming role in the
CKGR case; perhaps that was necessary given the limited Bushmen
91. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 333.
92. Id. at 335-36 (explaining the government's unwillingness to work with NGOs like
SI, which "brazenly flouto Botswana's normal legal procedures and pay[] scant attention
to Botswana's constitution, laws, precedents, policies, the international instruments to
which Botswana has and has not been signatory, or its sovereignty. SI disparages other
organizations working on behalf of the Bushmen and, perhaps most importantly, it seems
purposely innocent of the history and reality of the Bushmen's circumstances in
Botswana.")
93. Id.
94. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
95. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 341.
96. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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leadership and organization, but for many in Botswana, SI and
collaborators went too far, put forward preposterous allegations, and left
people wondering what other agendas the groups might have.97 The
politics of shame were effective in Kamanakao's case, but this tactic
backfired in the CKGR case. Kamanakao's case may have angered many
in government, but few could deny that the case had merit. In contrast,
the CKGR case had merit and few would dispute the condescension in
which Bushmen were held, but it was harder to feel shame with such
incendiary accusations. Moreover, SI fabricated evidence of a pristine
hunter-gatherer existence and presented an essentialized, ahistorical
view of Bushmen culture that, in the end, contributed to both the
judgment and its outcome, as well as to the promotion of culture now
extant in Botswana.9 8 However, SI and FPK efforts were not entirely in
vain. Many in the country agreed with one of the High Court justices
who, in her portion of the judgment and the verdict, drew attention to
the plight of the Bushmen.99 In fact, and in part due to this recent
controversy, "Bushman," especially Bushman "culture," is now
fashionable in Botswana.
97. See Solway, Conflict Diamonds, supra note 25, at 336, 341.
98. See id. at 340.
99. Sesana, 2006 Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Reps. (Dow, J.). In her opinion (one of three full
opinions written by the panel), Justice Dow not only discussed the behavior of the
government during the resettlement process, but also described the living situation of the
applicants in great detail. Id. E.1-E.9. She emphasized the applicants' status as
"indigenous," id. I H.1.5, and severely criticized the government's actions during the
resettlement, id. 11 H.9.1-34. In perhaps the most impassioned section of her opinion,
with the subpart heading "The Relevance of the Relative Powerlessness of the Applicants
to the Issue of Consent," she states:
The Applicants belong to an ethnic group that has been historically
looked down-upon, often considered to be no more than cheap,
disposable labour, by almost all other numerically superior ethnic
groups in Botswana. Until recently, perhaps it is still the case,
'Mosarwa', 'Lesarwa', 'Lekgalagadi' and 'Mokgalagadi' were common
terms of insult, in the same way as 'Nigger' and 'Kaffi' were/are. Any
adult Motswana who pretends otherwise is being dishonest in the
extreme. The relevance of this fact is that those Applicants who had
been politicised through their involvement with FPK, Ditshwanelo and
the Negotiating Team were bound to see any action that smelled of a
top-down approach as yet another act of disrespect by the initiators of
the action. On the other hand, the average non-politicised Applicant,
illiterate, dependant upon Government services, without political
representation at the high political level, was hardly in a position to
give genuine consent. It was the Respondent's obligation to put in
place mechanisms that promoted and facilitated true and genuine
consent by individuals, families and communities. Groups like
Ditshwanelo or the Negotiating Team could have been invited to
ensure some levelling out of the negotiation playing field.
Id. T H.9.3.3.
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V. LAWFARE AND ITS IRONIES: CULTURE FATIGUE
In the heady days during and after the Balopi Commission, the
Kamanakao case, and the debates surrounding changes to the House of
Chiefs, the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs introduced a new
National Policy on Culture, which was passed by Parliament in 2001.100
Since then, the government has elevated the importance of "culture"
and placed the cultural policy under the supervision of the newly formed
Ministry of Youth, Sport, and Culture.' 0 ' Culture is now "serious
business," and has become increasingly important to the nation. The
policy, to some extent, is the cultural expression of the government's
stance on ethnicity as it was formulated in the 2001 White Paper that
was produced in the wake of the Kamanakao case and the Balopi
Commission. This stance was institutionalized subsequently in law and
practice through constitutional and statutory changes including the
creation of the expanded but still Tswana-dominated Ntlo ya Kgosi.102
The policy celebrates cultural and linguistic diversity, 03 especially their
representation through performance. 04 However, the policy also
emphasizes only a single national language (Setswana), demoting other
languages, apart from English which is the official language, 05 as
worthy of "developing," but not standing on equal ground, either in
terms of representing the nation or holding official status.106
Similarly, while not neglecting non-Tswana cultures, the Policy
promotes a national culture into which one can read Tswana or a
homogenized version of cultural diversity, presented as a "national"
culture.107 Indeed, the Policy is carefully constructed and manages to
tread a fine line, both fostering and blurring distinction. For instance,
cultural groups (both cultural in a homogenized sense and groups
representing specific "cultures," such as the Yei) as well as artists, can
100. DEP'T OF CULTURE & YOUTH, MINISTRY OF LABOUR & HOME AFFAIRS, Directive No.
CAB 17/2001, NATIONAL POLIcY ON CULTURE (2001) (Bots.) [hereinafter POLICY ON
CULTURE].
101. I interviewed senior staff at the Department of Culture on March 25, 2010, who
explained many of their activities to me, including their funding of cultural group
activities.
102. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
103. See POLICY ON CULTURE, supra note 100, T 3.1.
104. See id. at Foreword.
105. Botswana, CIA - THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (click "People"; scroll down to "Languages") (last updated
Nov. 16, 2010).
106. See POLIcY ON CULTURE, supra note 100, TT 6.1(a), app. 1(4)(a)-(c).
107. See id. T 3.2 ("Our multi-ethnic value systems, traditions and beliefs as reflected
through the various languages, performing and visual arts as well as other forms of
cultural expression constitute the strands of a broader national culture .... ).
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request funding for their festivals and performances; to my knowledge
these are rarely denied. Notably, Reteng and all of its constituent
groups receive funds.108 The Department of Culture holds an annual
national culture day in different places in the country, both Tswana and
non-Tswana, where communities and artists are invited to celebrate
and showcase their culture and language. In practice, this means
primarily dance, poetry, costume, folklore, and food. In these instances,
cultural differences are acknowledged.
This policy also promotes a homogenized representation of
"national" culture in other ways. The most striking example is the
unprecedented rise of what are called "Cultural Groups." New cultural
groups are formed daily, each hoping for state support, a paid audience,
spots on local television, success at international competitions, and
opportunities to market themselves and their performances. I have seen
many and, in March 2010, attended a send-off and fundraiser, at which
many prominent citizens and Members of Parliament were in
attendance, for one of the more successful groups that was about to
depart to Burkina Faso for a major competition. 109 Many of the groups
are extremely popular and very talented; their DVDs are big sellers.
These are so-called traditional groups, but the question remains,
what tradition? They dress in skins, use homemade instruments, wear
small antelope horns (the trademark of Roy Sesana, the main applicant
in the CKGR case), and their dance and music are a hybrid of Tswana
morality tales, Bushmen dance, and other influences. One group,
"Culture Spears," calls itself the proud spears for the nation. For
instance, in a clever pastiche, Culture Spears' skimpy costumes include:
cloth in the colors of the Botswana flag, ostrich egg shell beads, animal
skins, bean-pod ankle percussion pieces, and an array of symbols from
various parts and points of Botswana history. As such, the group merges
time and space, enabling them to simultaneously represent all of
Botswana, yet no group or historical period in particular.
The Department of Culture wishes to "mainstream" culture so that
every government ministry and "stakeholder" has culture included in
their activities, and it wishes to market culture in more extensive and
effective ways. To quote the 2008 National Action Plan for Culture,
"Botswana has a unique culture but this is not easily and immediately
108. See id. 7.5.
109. The event was called Dikakapa Farewell Reception and was sponsored by the
Department of Arts and Culture. The group, Dikakapa, had won several regional
competitions and was heading to a continental competition. They are much like the group,
Culture Spears, described in the next paragraph. I attended at the invitation of a friend
who is a Member of Parliament.
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visible to a visitor entering the country."1 10 To that end, the Department
of Culture has planned a cultural village for tourists, but they face
obstacles in further commodifying culture. To remedy this, the
Department proposes consulting with other southern African nations
who have had more success in branding and marketing their culture,
engaging in, to use the Comaroffs' term, "Ethnicity, Inc.""n
The policy on culture is a key instrument through which culture and
minority rights are now governed, managed, and ultimately limited. The
Constitution and various statutes mentioned earlier set out the
government's official framework for the hierarchy and management of
ethnic groups in government bodies, but the culture policy shapes the
social expression of culture and ethnicity. For instance, while the policy
celebrates cultural and linguistic diversity, it stops short of advocating
that state media allow any language other than Tswana or English in
print or on air. Further, despite Parliament's 1997 agreement in
principle to do so, it does not promote mother tongue education for the
first years of primary school, a central plea of minority groups and one
they believe would help to redress past injustices, promote true
multiculturalism, and facilitate children's learning experience. 112 As
another example, a state television network aired the 2010 initiation
ceremonies of the Kgatla, a Tswana group, but has refused to televise
comparable cultural events in minority areas. Despite years of advocacy,
community radio stations are still refused licenses for fear, I am told, of
the languages and messages that may get aired on them.
Through the national policy on culture and the activities it
promotes, the state has valorized "culture," but it has also trivialized it
and turned it into a consumable. During a post-mortem discussing
Reteng's annual cultural event in July 2009, members attributed the
lower-than-expected attendance to exhaustion. In their own terms,
Botswana was suffering from "culture fatigue" since their event followed
a particularly intense month of performance and celebration. While this
phrase was staggering to my anthropological sensibilities, it makes
sense when culture is rendered in its neoliberal form as a consumable, a
thing, as opposed to a habitus, a way of being in the world. This also
attests to the triumph of liberalism; culture is construed as an option, a
matter of individual choice. At this point, culture can be embraced or
110. WAPULA N. RADITLOANENG & MATTHEW L.S. GBOKU, MINISTRY OF YOUTH, SPORT &
CULTURE, DEP'T OF CULTURE & YOUTH, NATIONAL AcTION PLAN FOR CULTURE:
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, vol. 11 (2008) (on file with author).
111. COMAROFF & COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, supra note 1.
112. Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo, Language Policy, Cultural Rights and the Law in
Botswana, in ALONG THE ROUTES OF POWER: EXPLORATIONS OF EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
LANGUAGE 285, 293, 298 (Martin Piutz et al. eds., 2006).
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pushed aside according to one's desire at the moment. Of course, by
objectifying and reifying culture in such ways, the state also attempts to
denude it of any political content and to marginalize rights claims
articulated in its name.
CONCLUSION
This account demonstrates the power and pitfalls of political
activism and lawfare when they are articulated through the modality of
culture. For the Bushmen, the rendition of their culture deployed in
their legal case proved their undoing. They got what they ostensibly
wanted-the right to return to the CKGR and live as they supposedly
always had-but the result was presumably not what they intended.
Their unsuccessful 2010 lawsuit requesting the restoration of water
services illustrates the conundrum produced by their earlier suit
requesting the right to return to the CKGR. Other minorities, such as
the Yei, achieved much more, including several key changes in
government statutes. The Bushmen have gained pride, confidence, and
greater recognition, although the latter is still incomplete in their view.
Lawfare has proved pivotal for rights seeking in Botswana, but its
effect has been mixed. In the CKGR case, the appellants overstepped
legitimate boundaries by the state's standards. They appealed to
conventions and treaties not signed by Botswana and fought a dirty
media battle. Although the politics of shame have proven extremely
significant in indigenous politics elsewhere, 113 the appellants were
successful insofar as they mustered much international support,
especially in the media. But the strategy backfired in the domestic court
of popular and government opinion. However, the politics of shame were
effective in Kamanakao's case due to its careful use and appeal to
international law.
In each case, the struggles have been cut short and distorted by
state policies, many of which have been put in place as a result of
minority activism. The state has been clever in usurping culture in a
way that both celebrates diversity and maintains the privileged position
of Tswana culture. At the same time, the state attempts to transform
subjective understandings of culture by implying that culture is an
object that one chooses to enjoy or practice, at his or her discretion.114 In
113. NIEZEN, supra note 47, at 183-85.
114. Cf. POVINELLI, supra note 9 (exploring the downsides of liberal multiculturalism, in
which peoples historically oppressed by colonialism continue to be subjugated, but now
through pressure to conform to certain idealized conceptions of their own culture); Jane
Cowan, Culture and Rights After Culture and Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 305, supra note 2, at 318-20 (discussing how the Australian
239
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
doing so, the state is in line with wider liberal and neoliberal forces that
render culture outside the individual, as objectified and reified, as a
matter of individual choice and as a commodity to be marketed.'I"
As noted earlier, liberalism produces its own paradoxes; Botswana's
minority movement is one such example. Minority subjects, empowered
by liberal individual rights, realize the limits inherent in these and
strive for group rights. Kymlicka defends liberal principles, such as
individual rights, but also notes their strong limitations, especially in
"multi-national" states."16 He wishes to rehabilitate liberalism and find
mechanisms whereby liberal regimes can offer genuine equality and
recognition without eliminating genuine difference. For Kymlicka,
political and historical injustices are implicit in the way in which
minority nations are marginalized in modern liberal states. Political
theorist Wendy Brown is less optimistic about liberalism's capacities.
She emphasizes that liberalism's "reduction of freedom to [individual]
rights, and of equality to equal standing before the law, eliminates from
view many sources of subordination, marginalization, and inequality
that organize liberal democratic societies and fashion their subjects."117
Brown argues that liberalism depoliticizes inequality and difference by
naturalizing it; one modality of doing so is to culturalize the politics of
difference.lls This renders questions of political economy redundant.
Botswana's culture policy is an apt example. It enables the state to
address minority demands and seemingly support them through
funding, but in a way that reduces the political claims of minority
groups to their ability to perform and market their culture. Thus, it
finesses questions of historically rooted inequalities.
Marginalized minorities in Botswana have been caught in the swirl
of cultural performance and are eager participants, when not fatigued
by culture. But many have not abandoned their larger political agenda.
It remains to be seen whether minority groups' ability to act on this
agenda allows them to reclaim the political underpinning of culture as
part of justice and rights claims, to navigate the paradoxes of liberalism,
and to refocus their struggle.
government's official state policy of multiculturalism actually constructs Aboriginal
identity at the interface of the interaction between Aboriginal Australians, European
Australians, and the law).
115. See generally COMAROFF & COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, supra note 1, at 23-33.
116. See KYMLICKA, supra note 21, at 152-72.
117. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AvERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE 17-18 (2006).
118. See id. at 19-24.
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This article builds on discussions about the potential benefits and
difficulties with developing a universal definition of indigenous peoples.
It explores the spaces made available for theorizing indigeneity by the
lack of a definition in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007. Specifically, this article addresses
the challenge presented by the diversity of groups claiming indigenous
status in Brazil. To what extent do distinct cosmologies and languages
that mark Amazonian Indians as unquestionably indigenous affect
newly recognized tribes in the rest of Brazil who share none of the indicia
of authenticity? This article theorizes how to situate these newly
recognized tribes within the context of the Declaration and addresses
what the Brazilian experience has to offer in providing openings for
claims that might have been made through alternative means, such as
land reform and international cultural heritage rights.
INTRODUCTION
In my recent book, Legalizing Identities: Becoming Black or Indian
in Brazil's Northeast,' I analyzed the process by which groups of black
* Ph.D., 2003, Duke University, Department of Cultural Anthropology; J.D., 1981,
University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., 1975, Temple University. Jan Hoffman
French is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Richmond. In addition
to her recent book, she has published articles in the American Anthropologist, American
Ethnologist, and the Americas, as well as numerous book chapters. French has held
postdoctoral fellowships at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Northwestern
University, and the University of Maryland, College Park. Before becoming an
anthropologist, she practiced law. I would like to thank Alfred Aman, Jr., Shane Greene,
Bradley Levinson, Beverly Stoeltje, and Christiana Ochoa for organizing the conference at
which this article was first presented and for encouraging its publication.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter 2011)
@ Indiana University Maurer School of Law
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rural workers were reconstituting themselves in relation to their strand
of indigenous ancestry and were being recognized as Indians by the
Brazilian government. 2 Brazil is known as a place where indigenous
peoples are exemplified by non-European languages, cosmologies,
rituals, dress, and preconquest histories. However, over the past few
decades, Brazil has been pioneering a broadening of the concept of
indigenous peoples to include people previously assumed to be fully
assimilated into the nation's general population. In fact, over the past
thirty years, the Brazilian government has recognized more than forty
new "tribes" in the Northeast region alone.3 During that same period,
many other presumably assimilated people demanded and received both
recognition and access to land as Indians in other parts of eastern
Brazil, including the state of Rio de Janeiro. 4
These new Indians exist within a larger, flexible, international
context of indigenous peoples made available for theorizing indigeneity
by the lack of definition in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration).5 To what extent do distinct
cosmologies and languages that unquestionably mark Amazonian
groups, such as the Wari, Xavante, or Kayapo, as indigenous affect
newly recognized tribes in the rest of Brazil who share none of these
indicia of authenticity? Is it conceptually defensible from both an ethical
and legal perspective of justice to include in a single category both
people who have a clear claim to "difference" and have struggled for
generations to gain even limited political autonomy, and those who have
just recently discovered their claim to indigeneity under an expansive
view of indigenous peoples?
This article is divided into three sections. The first explains the
construction of global indigenous identity through the extensive process
1. JAN HOFFMAN FRENCH, LEGALIZING IDENTITIES: BECOMING BLACK OR INDIAN IN
BRAZIL'S NORTHEAST (2009).
2. "[I]n Brazil [the term] Indian has gone through phases of denigration and of
regeneration. The indigenous movement of the 1970s and 1980s reappropriated the term
and infused it with a substantial dose of political agency." ALCIDA RITA RAMOS,
INDIGENISM: ETHNIC POLITICS IN BRAZIL 6 (1998). In fact, the use of the term has come to
be considered a "dynamic element[] of struggle." MARIA ELENA GARCIA, MAKING
INDIGENOUS CITIZENS: IDENTITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MULTICULTURAL ACTIVISM IN PERU
27 (2005).
3. JOAO PACHECO DE OLIVEIRA FILHO, ATLAS DAS TERRAS INDIGENAS DO NORDESTE
(1993); Stephen G. Perz, et al., Contributions of Racial-Ethnic Reclassification and
Demographic Processes to Indigenous Population Resurgence: The Case ofBrazil, 43 LATIN
AM. RES. REV. 7, 27 (2008).
4. See generally JONATHAN W. WARREN, RACIAL REVOLUTIONS: ANTIRACISM AND
INDIAN RESURGENCE IN BRAZIL (2001) (analyzing the processes of racial formation among
"posttraditional Indians" at various sites in eastern Brazil).
5. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].
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of negotiating and adopting the Declaration. Due to insurmountable
difficulties in reaching agreement, a definition of indigenous peoples
was simply excluded from the Declaration. What remains is an open-
ended concept to be interpreted contextually. This article takes the view
that a definition of indigenous peoples in the Declaration would be
counterproductive, thus supporting the decision made by the
deliberating body. In the second section, I address the challenge that the
failure to agree on a legal definition of indigenous peoples poses to
anthropology, a field superbly positioned to analyze and assist in
conceptualizing meanings of indigeneity. Therefore, it is argued that
discussions of international legal definitions of indigeneity should be
made integral to anthropological perspectives. The third section uses
the Brazilian example to suggest both a temporal and a spatial
construction of diaspora as a justification for a broadened perspective on
indigeneity worldwide. In the Brazilian case, the definition of Indian
enacted in 1973 performed the same function as the exclusion of a
definition of indigenous peoples in the Declaration on an international
level, an opening up of the criteria for claiming indigenous rights.
I. GLOBAL INDIGENOUS IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
After over two decades of meetings and negotiations, the
Declaration was adopted by the 61st General Assembly of the United
Nations on September 13, 2007, establishing
a universal framework of minimum standards for the
survival, dignity, well-being and rights of the world's
indigenous peoples. The Declaration addresses both
individual and collective rights; cultural rights and identity;
rights to education, health, employment, language, and
others. It outlaws discrimination against indigenous
peoples and promotes their full and effective participation
in all matters that concern them. It also ensures their right
to remain distinct and to pursue their own priorities in
economic, social and cultural development. The Declaration
explicitly encourages harmonious and cooperative relations
between States and indigenous peoples.6
6. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited
Oct. 17, 2010).
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Although the Declaration is not a legally binding instrument, it is
declaratory of customary international law.7 Even while the Declaration
was in draft form, national courts began citing it in support of indigenous
rights.8 After twenty-three years of negotiation, the Declaration was
adopted by a vote of 143-4 with eleven abstentions.9 According to a U.N.
press release, "countries voting against the Declaration (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United States) said they could not support it because
of concerns over provisions on self-determination, land and resources rights,
and, among others, language giving indigenous peoples a right of veto over
national legislation and State management of resources." 0 The twenty-
three year delay in adoption is attributable to two sticking points: the draft
Declaration asserts the importance of self-determination of indigenous
peoples," and the term "indigenous peoples" is not defined. The adoption of
the Declaration was delayed for an additional year as a result of objections
and proposed amendments by a group of African states.12 Their
fundamental objections were the absence of a definition of indigenous
peoples and the possible encouragement of internal ethnic groups to assert a
right to self-determination and to secede from the state.'3
7. Paul Oldham & Miriam Anne Frank, 'We the Peoples...' The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 24 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 5, 5 (Apr.
2008).
8. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-
Determination and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT'L AFF. 7, 23 (2008)
(citing (Consol.) re Maya Land Rights, Claim Nos. 171-72, 131 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (Belize),
available at http://www.belizelaw.org/supreme-court/judge_1ist/civiljudge_2007.html)
(follow "Supreme Court Claims Nos. 171 and 172 of 2007 (Consolidated) re Maya land
rights" hyperlink).
9. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted against the
Declaration. Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya,
Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine abstained. Press Release, General
Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 'Major
Step Forward' Towards Human Rights for All, Says President, U.N. Press Release
GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter G.A. Press Release].
10. Id.
11. See generally Daes, supra note 8, at 8 (describing the author's (who was the
principal drafter of the Declaration) belief that there is an intrinsic link between self-
identification and self-determination); Andrea Muehlebach, What Self in Self-
Determination? Notes from the Frontiers of Transnational Indigenous Activism, 10
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUD. CULTURE & POWER 241 (2003) (describing how transnational
indigenous activists are shaping the development of the concept of self-determination)
[hereinafter Muehlebach, Self-Determination].
12. The three African states that delayed the final vote were Botswana, Namibia, and
Nigeria.
13. See Draft Aide Memoire, African Group, United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous People paras. 2.0-5.0 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.ipacc.org.
zaluploads/docs/Africanaidememoire.pdf. After further negotiations, all of the African
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The, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), a
nongovernmental organization, estimates that "[t]here are over 370
million indigenous people in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the
Pacific."1 4 However, the concept of indigenous peoples encoded in the
Declaration is left undefined.15 In the absence of an agreement on a
definition, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples
(WGIP)16 and the inter-sessional Working Group on the draft
Declaration1 7 asserted that an explicit definition of indigenous peoples
would reduce the effectiveness of the Declaration, which should, it was
argued, hinge primarily on self-identification. For example, most
definitions that were considered and rejected required that people show
direct descent from an identifiable group of people inhabiting the same
place as the group claiming indigenous rights before it was colonized. It
was feared that this requirement of "firstness," would exclude groups in
Africa and Asia. Another problematic requirement was one in which
cultural practices or a distinct language must be retained from the
distant past. This would have excluded groups that were forced to
countries voted in favor of the Declaration; Burundi, Kenya, and Nigeria abstained. G.A.
Press Release, supra note 9.
14. Int'l Work Grp. for Indigenous Aff. [IWGIA], Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp (last visited Oct.17, 2010). Their
inclusion criteria can also be found on their website. IWGIA, Identification of Indigenous
Peoples: Indigenous Peoples-Who are They?, http://www.iwgia.org/sw641.asp (last visited
Oct. 17, 2010). The International Labour Organization confirms that "[ilndigenous and
tribal peoples constitute at least 5,000 distinct peoples with a population of more than 370
million, living in 70 different countries." ILO, Nicaragua Ratifies ILO Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.ilocarib.org.
tt/portallindex.php?option=com.content&task=view&id=141 1&Itemid=368.
15. See Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, State of the World's Indigenous Peoples, at 4-7, U.N. Doc. STIESA/328, U.N. Sales
No. 09.VI.13 (2009) (explaining the decision to exclude a definition).
16. The United Nations Economic and Social Council established the WGIP as a
"transnational locality" (in the sense that a new political space was created) in 1982. See
Andrea Muehlebach, 'Making Place' at the United Nations: Indigenous Cultural Politics at
the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 415,
415-16 (2001) ("It is the only global institution at which indigenous identity has for years
been discussed.") [hereinafter Muehlebach, Cultural Politics].
17. In 1995, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights established the inter.
sessional Working Group with "the sole purpose of elaborating a draft declaration on the
rights of indigenous peoples." Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Working
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
http://www2.ohchr.orglenglishlissues/indigenous/groups/groups-02.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2010). That same year, the General Assembly decided that the "United Nations
Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations should also be used to assist representatives
of indigenous communities and organizations authorized to participate in the
deliberations of the Working Group on the draft declaration." Id.
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assimilate but are now dedicated to reconstituting group identity as
indigenous.18
Most discussions of the Declaration begin with the working
definition of indigenous proposed by U.N. Special Rapporteur Jos6
Martinez-Cobo in his Study of the Problem of Discrimination against
Indigenous Populations, which states:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion
and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.19
The WGIP bore this definition in mind as negotiations proceeded
but did not adopt it.20 Moreover, although there is a definitional
provision in the International Labour Organization (ILO) International
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 of 1989, which has been
ratified by twenty-one countries, 21 the indigenous negotiators insisted
18. For example, the Mashpee Indians in Massachusetts were only recently granted
federal recognition after decades of appealing a 1980s court decision that found they had
not proven historical continuity or distinct cultural practices traceable to specific
ancestors from the same place. See JAMES CLIFFORD, Identity in Mashpee, in THE
PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART
277 (1988). See also Andrew Ryan, Mashpee Tribe Wins Federal Recognition, Bos. GLOBE,
Feb. 16, 2007 at B8 (for information on the 2007 federal recognition).
19. Special Rapporteur on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations, Final Rep. on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations, para. 379, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (Sept. 30, 1983) (by Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo). According to
Erica-Irene Daes, this definition has been unofficially used in certain cases. Special
Rapporteur on the Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Final Rep. on the
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, para. 18, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes).
20. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2002).
21. In 1989, ILO Convention No. 169 was adopted with the following provision in
Article 1:
1. This Convention applies to:
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that anything short of self-identification would not provide the
flexibility needed for an inclusive and self-determining process of
recognition.
Components of both the Martinez-Cobo and ILO definitions were
problematic from the perspective of self-identification. For example, in
the Martinez-Cobo definition, the phrase "historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories"
presented the problem of excluding peoples living in nonsettler societies,
along with displaced and diasporic indigenous peoples. 22 Another
example is the 2006 U.S. proposal to the Working Group on the Draft
Declaration, which illustrates just how limiting the effort to pin down a
definition can be. The U.S. proposal was rejected by the drafters, but it
would have required state recognition prior to U.N. recognition:
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the
national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially
by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the
provisions of this Convention apply.
ILO: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art.
1, paras. 1-2, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). Nicaragua is
the most recent country to ratify the Convention, bringing the number to 21. ILO,
Nicaragua Ratifies ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (Aug.
30, 2010), WWW.ILO.ORG, http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/portallindex.php?option=com-content&
task-view&id=1411&Itemid=368.
22. Martinez-Cobo, supra note 19, at para. 379; see also James Clifford, Varieties of
Indigenous Experience: Diasporas, Homelands, Sovereignties, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE
TODAY 197 (Marisol de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007) (exploring the diversity of
claims to indigeneity and arguing for their legitimacy). In this article, I am not directly
addressing the issue of connection to land as a defining factor for indigeneity in the
Declaration. The tension between a definition that focuses on social and cultural identity
and one that is primarily about territory is reflected in the Declaration. Right to land
"which [indigenous peoples] have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used" is
enshrined in Article 26, along with a directive to States to "give legal recognition and
protection to these lands." Declaration, supra note 5, art. 26, paras. 1, 3. However, claim to
land or connection to territory is not a prerequisite for coverage by the Declaration. For
example, "historic injustices" are seen as resulting from "inter alia, their colonization and
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources." Id. annex (emphasis added).
Cultural protection and self-determination are accorded more space in the Declaration
than land issues.
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Indigenous peoples have the right to be recognized as
such by the State through a transparent and reasonable
process. When recognizing indigenous peoples States
should include a variety of factors, including, but not
limited to . . . whether the group . . . self-identifies as
indigenous; . . . is comprised of descendants of persons
who inhabited a geographic area prior to the sovereignty
of the State; . . . historically had been sovereign; . . .
maintains a distinct community and aspects of
governmental structure; . . . has a cultural affinity with
a particular area of land or territories; . . . has distinct
objective characteristics such as language, religion,
culture; and, . . . has been historically regarded and
treated as indigenous by the State.23
Evident from this proposal is the influence of the U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs requirements that have restricted federal recognition for
many groups over the years. 24 Such a definition, it was felt by the
drafters, would have been impractical in a transnational context. The
indigenous participants viewed the lack of a definition of indigenous
peoples as impractical and equivalent to a refusal to use the "language
understood by those wielding power."25 Indigenous representatives in
WGIP meetings in the 1990s expressed the view that unless a "law
reaches out to the varieties of human existence," it should be considered
deficient. 26 They also asserted that for a law to be morally valid, "it
must have the consent of . .. those affected" 27 by its provisions.
Self-identification, although fundamental to the recognition of
indigenous peoples on the international level, is not the only criterion
important to indigenous representatives, as "[i]ndigenous peoples are
23. Chairperson-Rapporteur on the ESCOR, Comm'n H.R., Report of the Working
Group on the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27-29,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79 (Mar. 22, 2006) (by Luis-Enrique ChAvez). In June, the Obama
administration announced that the United States would review its position on the
Declaration. Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Review of the U.N. Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (June 4, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/
2010/06/142662.htm.
24. E.g., CLIFFORD, supra note 18 (describing the history of Massachusetts' Mashpee
Indians and their 1976 lawsuit claim for land, which was ultimately unsuccessful because
they did not meet the "tribal" criteria).
25. Justin Kenrick & Jerome Lewis, Indigenous Peoples' Rights and the Politics of the
Term 'Indigenous', 20 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 4, 9 (Apr. 2004).
26. THORNBERRY, supra note 20, at 10 (2002) (quoting ANDREW LINKLATER, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CoMMUNITY: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-
WESTPHALIAN ERA 96 (1998)).
27. Id.
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not only those who say they are indigenous but also those who are
accepted by a global network of nations and communities with similar
claims and sources of recognition."28 Therefore, both self-identification
and other-identification are critical to public recognition. There is little
doubt that the decision to leave the concept open and flexible has
contributed to the expansion of the number of groups who self-identify
and who are recognized as indigenous by the United Nations and other
international bodies. It has also encouraged the growing identification
of indigenous activists, representatives, and intellectuals with a global
indigenous identity that has influenced the actions of international and
state entities. 29 Such a global indigenous identity allows groups to "gain
voice through cross-national connections that empower their approach
to national dilemmas."30 Moreover, this global indigenous identity does
not adhere to international actors alone, but is crucial to self-
identification by local peoples in settings ranging from the Sami people
in northern Europe to the San people in southern Africa.31
28. RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITIcS
OF IDENTITY 22, 227 n.21 (2003) (reporting a definition proposed by indigenous delegates).
In the United States, the assumption of solidarity among indigenous peoples is not a
given. For example, the leadership of the Eastern Band of Cherokee opposes federal
recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe in North Carolina. See, e.g., Lumbees Clash with
Cherokee at Senate Hearing, INDIANZ.COM, (July 13, 2006), http://64.38.12.138/News/
2006/014928.asp.; Senators Seek Lumbee Recognition, NEWSOBSERVER.COM, (Oct. 10, 2009,
2:08 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2009/10/01/121289/senators-seek-lumbee
recognition.html#storylink-misearch.
29. See, e.g., NIEZEN, supra note 28 (discussing the indigenism movement as a new
global political entity and providing a history of the movement's relationships with states
and international bodies); Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Rights and the Collective
Conscious, 18 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 2002, at 1, 2-3; Daes, supra note 8, at 8-11;
Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, 4-9; Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
414, 414-15, 417-26 (1998); Muehlebach, Self-Determination, supra note 11, at 244-46,
254-56, 261-63; Muehlebach, Cultural Politics, supra note 16 (describing the WGIP's role
in the transnational indigenous movement); Oldham & Frank, supra note 7 (giving a
detailed account of the Declaration's adoption and the history of its drafting and status as
a resolution); Viniyanka Prasad, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
A Flexible Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 297, 311-15 (2009). But see Michaela Pelican, Complexities of Indigeneity and
Autochthony: An African Example, 36 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 52 (2009) (describing several
examples of how countries have ignored global indigenism or used it to harm those the
movement intended to protect).
30. Anna Tsing, Indigenous Voice, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE TODAY 33, 57 (Marisol
de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007).
31. See Dorothy L. Hodgson, Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on the Indigenous
Rights Movement in Africa and the Americas, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1037, 1039-40
(2002).
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The trend toward an expansive definition of indigenous peoples
began well before the Declaration was adopted and is directly linked to
the increased participation of representatives from Africa and Asia
(places that, until recently, were excluded from consideration as not
having indigenous groups). 32 As standard assumptions moved away
from the notion that the existence of indigenous peoples were confined
to settler societies, such as those in the Western Hemisphere, Australia,
and New Zealand, an expanded perspective on the definition of
indigeneity began to take hold in U.N. deliberations. The involvement of
indigenous participants in deliberations and negotiations leading up to
the Declaration's adoption was unprecedented. 33 In 1982, when the
WGIP was established, only thirty representatives were present. In
1999, nearly one thousand participants attended the WGIP meeting,
creating a site of "discursive density."34
The Global Indigenous Peoples' Caucus, consisting of the group of
indigenous delegates present at the WGIP meetings, would meet to
discuss their positions on the issues at stake through intense debate
and consensus decision making. 35 Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson and
Special Rapporteur of the WGIP from its founding until 2001 and
principal drafter of the Declaration, explains that indigenous peoples
were not part of original state building. 36 This reminder makes the
indigenous representation at every stage during the twenty-three year
period of drafting, debating, and redrafting the Declaration even more
impressive. Such participation contributed to the constitution of a
supranational indigenous identification. Patrick Thornberry,
international law scholar and an observer at WGIP meetings, described
32. U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, Trust Fund on Indigenous Issues
Relating to the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People
http://www.un.orglesalsocdev/unpfi/en/secondtrustfund.html#2009 (last visited Oct. 9,
2010). In May 2009, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, as
advisor for projects for the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People,
proposed to award grants to nineteen projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Eurasia (a region covering Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central
Asia, and Transcaucasia), North America, and the Pacific.
33. See Daes, supra note 8, at 12-18; see also Muehlebach, Self-Determination, supra
note 11 (discussing the increasingly visible presence of indigenous delegates in the
international arena in a number of contexts); Oldham & Frank, supra note 7, at 6-8.
34. Muehlebach Cultural Politics, supra note 16, at 415, 420.
35. E.g., Oldham & Frank, supra note 7 (describing in detail the response of the
Caucus to the African Group's Draft Aide-Memoire).
36. See Daes, supra note 8, at 13. State-building is a reference to the process by which
a nation is transformed into a nation-state with an independent government and laws. In
Hispanic America, for example, creoles (descendants of colonizing Spaniards) were the
primary group involved in state-building in the nineteenth century. Indigenous
populations were excluded from the state-building project.
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the meetings as "[a]rguments between government delegations and the
indigenous [that] seemed interminable, their position statements
incommensurable. But there was also a sense of something shifting, of
ideas grinding their way through the morass of argument and rebuttal,
storytelling and complaint."3 7
While increased indigenous participation in the draft Declaration
negotiations was crucial to its eventual adoption, there was also some
concern that such participation was restricted to an upper echelon of
indigenous delegates. Anthropologist Jonathan Friedman has argued
the risk that class inequalities might be reinforced between delegates
and the people at home whom they represent. 38 He refers to the
internationally active indigenous delegates as part of a "global cocktail
circuit."39 Over a decade ago, when Friedman made this comment, it
may have been appropriate to be suspicious of claims to a global
indigenous identity, both as a top-down imposition and as a distraction
from studying local cultural specificities. Today, it is necessary to
rethink such cautionary reactions because indigeneity and indigenous
rights are commonly accepted notions that affect localities around the
world. Generally, an anthropological approach to indigeneity would
emphasize the specificities of particular groups, paying less attention to
the impact of events at an international level (see section III below).
However, some anthropologists, such as Mary Louise Pratt, are
beginning to take a different approach and are criticizing the
established anthropological wisdom by asserting that it should no longer
be a given that "perform[ing] the always legitimating scholarly gesture
of presenting complicated truth against . . . reductive ideology"40 is the
only or best way to approach global indigenous identity. This still leaves
the question of which foundational justifications for claims to
indigenous rights are valid, particularly if self-identification has become
the primary requirement on the international level. Once historical
continuity, language and cultural practices, and blood quantum are no
37. THORNBERRY, supra note 20, at 10. See generally Noel Castree, Differential
Geographies: Place, Indigenous Rights and 'Local' Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133, 161
(2004) (exploring reasons why indigenous peoples should have the right "to make their
own places rather than have them made for them.").
38. Jonathan Friedman, Indigenous Struggles and the Discreet Charm of the
Bourgeoisie, in PLACES AND POLITICS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 53, 64 (Roxann
Prazniak & Arif Dirlik eds., 2001).
39. Id.
40. Mary Louise Pratt, Afterword: Indigeneity Today, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE
TODAY 397, 400 (Marisol de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007).
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longer required foundational justifications for the recognition of an
indigenous people, it will be crucial to develop other justifications.41
More capacious definitional possibilities allow peoples claiming
indigeneity, such as international agencies and national governments,
to consider other morally powerful justifications for such claims. In The
Moral Force of Indigenous Politics: Critical Liberalism and the
Zapatistas, political scientist Courtney Jung provides an alternative
analysis. 42 She sees indigenous identity as a "political achievement," not
as "an accident of birth" or a "spontaneous global reaction in defense of
cultural preservation."43 Jung proposes a theory of political identity
formation according to which "indigenous people are partly constituted
as a potential group because they occupy a common location of
structural exclusion from the modern state, not because they possess a
common language or culture."44 Recognition as indigenous should flow
not from a notion of existential identity, but rather from what the larger
society and state has done to the group over time-how the group has
been treated by state institutions and majority populations. 45 However,
such a structural location does not by itself produce an indigenous
rights movement. The concept of indigenous rights must first "develop[]
sufficient traction to orient, and to open the political space for,
indigenous politics." 46 Echoing such a perspective, anthropologist Mary
Louise Pratt has observed that indigeneity should be viewed "not as a
condition but [as] a force," a "bundle of generative possibilities."47 In my
opinion, the political space referred to by Jung, together with Pratt's
notion of a "force," are served by loosening definitional fetters and
considering alternative justifications for indigenous self-identification
and other-identification. 48
41. There has been a certain fetishization of firstness or priority of settlement with
regard to identification of indigeneity around the world. However, a claim to being first in
a particular place can be a double-edged sword. Indigenous rights, based on a claim to
priority, may be used by those who are structurally in a relatively powerful, and even
exploitative, position. See Adam Kuper, The Return of the Native, 44 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 389, 389 (2003).
42. COURTNEY JUNG, THE MORAL FORCE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS: CRITICAL
LIBERALISM AND THE ZAPATISTAS (2008) (analyzing the shift from peasant to indigenous
politics by the Zapatistas in Mexico).
43. Id. at 11, 20.
44. Id. at 69.
45. See id. at 33.
46. Id. at 69.
47. Pratt, supra note 40, at 400, 402.
48. As one Zapatista activist who was at first reluctant to embrace indigenous identity
indicated to Jung, "his concern was never an existential one .... Instead, what he hoped
was that indigenous identity would reconstitute the terms of struggle." JUNG, supra note
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II. ANTHROPOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has written on the contributions
anthropology has made, and can make, to understanding international
law.49 Merry's review of the literature has unearthed a number of
contributions, particularly the component that shows how
anthropological theory helps us understand "how international law is
produced and how it works."50 The inverse is also true. International
legal definitional discussions, decisions, and contestations can greatly
enhance anthropological thinking about indigeneity.
A number of anthropologists evaluating definitional issues
surrounding the terms indigenous peoples and indigeneity have
concluded that such terms are not useful anthropological concepts from
an analytical perspective because they are too essentializing, too tied to
the land, or too broadly conceived.51 However, those same scholars
condescendingly agree that, although such terms are not adequate for
anthropological analysis, they are useful as legal concepts, as tools for
political persuasion, or as meaningful terms "for those who identify
themselves as indigenous."52 Some take a slippery slope approach,
arguing that the use of the concepts will inevitably lead to ethnic
strife,53  while others distinguish between indigenism (an
internationalist endeavor) and ethnonationalism, which rests on myths
42, at 78. In other words, his reluctance was not based on his own conception of his
personal identity, but stemmed from considerations of his political identity.
49. See Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 99, 100 (2006).
50. Id. at 9. "[A]nthropological research plays a critical role in examining how
international law works in practice, mapping the circulation of ideas and procedures as
well as examining the array of small sites in which international law operates. . . ." Id. at
111.
51. See Kuper, supra note 41; Pelican, supra note 29, at 53.
52. Pelican, supra note 29, at 54; accord Alan Barnard, Kalahari Revisionism, Vienna
and the 'Indigenous Peoples' Debate, 14 Soc. ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 7, 13 (2006). Pelican
believes that "stripping the concept of 'indigenous peoples' of its original connotations of
priority in time and historical continuity is debatable." Pelican, supra note 29, at 56.
Pelican also discusses the relationship between Cameroon's Grassfielders and Mbororo
people as an example; the latter, despite being relative newcomers "locally perceived as
strangers or allogbnes, qualify on the international level as indigenous peoples." Id. at 58.
This leads me to raise the question of how much deference international agencies should
give to local views (the United States' desire to impose its definitional requirements is
instructive). But see John Bowen, Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous
Peoples' Rights? Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century, 16
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12 (2000) (proposing an intermediate and alternative two-level
analysis for determining indigeneity from an anthropological perspective).
53. See Friedman, supra note 38, at 397-99; Kuper, supra note 41, at 395; Pelican,
supra note 29, at 61.
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of cultural purity and frequently involves movements that seek
secession from the host nation-state. 54
There is also a fear that encouraging collective indigenous rights
might lead to abuses of individual human rights by a group uncontrolled
by the state. This concern is often based on an assumed lack of
democratic process in indigenous settings. However, indigenous groups
are aware of concerns about potential abuses of individual rights and
have begun to address this issue at an international level. The Manila
Declaration of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution,
Peace Building, Sustainable Development, and Indigenous Peoples, held
in December 2000 with extensive indigenous participation, recognized
justice as universal and acknowledged that a revitalization of traditions
should not lead to oppression of women and children.55 Again, there is a
risk of condescension in assuming that people who self-identify as
indigenous are uninterested in or incapable of participating in a
democratic process.5 6 There is no reason why international legal
processes that call human rights violations into question cannot be
applied to recognized indigenous groups.
In fact, anthropologists are increasingly arguing against the notion
that collective rights are intrinsically dangerous.5 7 Moreover, the notion
of "culture," as conceptualized by anthropologists, has shifted to an
active process of self-making and production of identity. In the
international indigenous rights context, a consensus is growing that
such identity construction is central to "building global alliances to
resist global processes of dispossession."5 8 A number of legal scholars
have begun to take the position that issues of representativeness and
possible abuses of individual rights should neither be ignored nor
54. Noel Castree, Differential Geographies: Place, Indigenous Rights and 'Local'
Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133, 152 (2004) (citing Ronald Niezen, Recognizing
Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of Indigenous Peoples, 42
COMP. STUD Soc'Y & HIST. 119, 120 (2000)).
55. International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable
Development and Indigenous Peoples, December 6-8, 2000, Manila Declaration, pmbl., § 5,
available at http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc-download
&gid=40&Itemid=27 (describing the proceedings of a conference with ninety participants
from indigenous communities on five continents, all of whom signed the declaration).
56. For many years, scholars of the Iroquois Confederacy ironically touted the myth
that the U.S. Constitution and American democracy itself were based partially on the
Iroquois example. This trend has shifted but not without Congress weighing in. In 1988,
Congress passed a resolution acknowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy
of Nations to the development of the U.S. Constitution. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th
Cong. (1988), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdflhconres331.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2010).
57. See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 29, at 3; Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, at 5.
58. Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, at 9.
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privileged when considering who should have collective indigenocks
rights, thus helping to allay fears of the violation of human rights of
individuals who constitute part of the group.59
At the same time, most anthropologists dealing with these matters
mention international law definitional discussions but do not
incorporate such definitions into an anthropological consideration. 60 For
example, Alan Barnard equates indigenous peoples with other legal
categories and insists that this phrase should not be "in our glossary of
technical terms."6 1 Barnard's view is a shortsighted approach to a term
that, since the 1970s, has become embedded in theoretical discussions at
all levels. In other words, the term "indigenous peoples" is not simply an
"ideological construct" or "a useful tool for political persuasion," as
suggested by Barnard. 62 Accordingly, anthropologist Sidsel Saugestad
has observed, "anthropologists writing about indigenous issues need to
take heed of the codification of the concept taking place within the UN
system . . . . If anthropologists want to reconceptualize 'indigenous
peoples,' the point of departure must be this present use."63
This approach also considers how the success of the global
indigenous movement might affect the epistemological assumptions
underlying anthropological definitions of indigeneity and indigenous
peoples. Anthropologists are dedicated to specificities as the crux of
much of their work, but a focus on specificity should not lead
anthropologists to ignore the global framework of indigenous rights,
including international legal considerations now accepted and utilized
in local discourse and praxis.64 As groups around the world adopt the
59. See, e.g., Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations
by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2006) (arguing that
because the U.S. is subject to international human rights norms and American Indian
tribes are a political subunit of the United States, the United States is responsible for
violations of individual rights that take place on tribal lands and has an obligation to
rectify such situations); Kingsbury, supra note 29, at 425-26; Luis Roniger, Citizenship in
Latin America: New Works and Debates, 10 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 489, 500-02 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 52 (arguing that the emphasis on prior occupation and
universality in international law's definitions is inadequate to fully satisfy considerations
of equality and self-governance and proposing a more locally sensitive analytical
framework instead).
61. Barnard, supra note 52, at 12.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Sidsel Saugestad, Discussion, On the Return of the Native, 45 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 264 (2004).
64. Anthropologists who have confronted this crucial issue include JOANNE RAPPAPORT,
INTERCULTURAL UTOPIAS: PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, CULTURAL EXPERIMENTATION, AND
ETHNIC PLURALISM IN COLUMBIA 64-65 (2005); ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, FRICTION: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL CONNECTION 205-06 (2005); Tania Murray Li, Articulating
Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Trial Slot, 42 COMP. STUD.
Soc'Y AND HIST. 149, 155-57, 169-70 (2000).
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category of indigenous peoples as a claim to recognition, self-
conceptualization of indigenousness has become crucial to identity
formation and visions of the future. Since the 1960s, when an
epistemological shift took hold, sociocultural anthropologists have
distinguished between how people being studied explain their practices
and beliefs (called "emic" or folk explanations) and how anthropologists
explain those same practices and beliefs (called "etic" or analytical
explanations).65 This division, though important at the time it was
theorized, should be reconsidered. Peoples' use of the international
discourse of indigenous rights places in question the accepted emic/etic
and folk/analytical dichotomy.
Emic and etic are merely two poles of a continuum in which varying
degrees of self-definition are intertwined with what were previously
purely analytical concepts, such as indigeneity. Just as the imbrications
of global and local reveal transnational and translocal connections
between international and local identities, it is critical that
anthropologists not be dismissive of indigenous as an identity simply
imposed from above, but rather as a process of self-identification. This
provides an opening to consider in a different way the original question
posed in this article: how to honor the long-term struggles for political
autonomy and self-determination of unquestionably indigenous peoples
in the eyes of the world, while at the same time expanding the
definitional heft of indigeneity to encompass those who have come to
self-identify as indigenous more recently.
III. PRODUCTIVE CONTRADICTIONS
When considering a contradiction based on a presumed opposition,
it is often productive to question that opposition, as proposed above
regarding the emic/etic divide. James Clifford suggests reconsideration
of the dichotomous "poles of autochthony (we are here and have been
here forever) and diaspora (we yearn for a homeland)."66 Emphasizing
the varieties of indigenous experience, he sees the displacement and
migration of indigenous peoples as an "uneven, continuum of
65. See, e.g., PAUL BoHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIv 4-6 (Oxford
Univ. Press reprt. 1968) (1957); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-
30 (1973); MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY: A HISTORY OF
THEORIES OF CULTURE 568-604 (Alta Mira Press updated ed. 2001) (1968); Stanley
Diamond, Anthropology in Question, in REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 401, 423-25 (Dell
Hymes ed., 1972); William S. Willis, Jr., Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet, in
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY, supra, at 121, 126-27.
66. Clifford, supra note 22, at 205.
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attachments."67 Examples include those who have moved to urban
areas, as well as people who have been expelled or forced to move from
their rooted places, all of whom are "improvising new ways to be
native."68
At this point, it is useful to return to the question first posed in this
article, how to justify including in the single category of indigenous
peoples both those who have a clear claim to difference and those who
have only recently discovered they have a claim to indigeneity under an
expansive view of indigenous peoples. In considering this question, it is
fruitful to imagine how such new ways of being native as the result of
displacement (to cities, for example) differ from the reconstitution of
indigenous identity by people like those living in the Brazilian
Northeast, who assert their identity without clear evidence of
indigeneity. The first form of displacement is a movement through
space. The second is a movement through time, where there has been a
break in identification with an indigenous past. Both involve a yearning
and desire for place, distant or immediate. Anthropologist Tom Biolsi
has reviewed the varieties of "indigenous political space" in the United
States and described it as one in which Indian people carry "portable
rights beyond reservations" (more Indians live off than on a reservation,
and primarily in urban areas). He analyzes this variety in relation to
the diaspora concept and considers it a form of "indigenous
cosmopolitanism" because its participants do not confine themselves to
indigenous territory but situate themselves both physically and
culturally throughout the national space.69
Under this analysis, time can stand in for space, thus allowing for a
form of temporal diasporic indigeneity. Just as one might consider the
notion of diasporic indigeneity as an alternative way to inhabit
"indigenous political space," a temporal diaspora might be an
appropriate way to think about those who are reconstituting an
indigenous identity. They base their reconstitution of identity on the
presumed settlement in a particular place in centuries past. The "new"
tribes in Brazil's Northeast imagine their indigenous roots in a time
before prior generations were decimated by disease, assimilationist
policies, and Catholic Church resettlement of surviving members of
distinct tribes to missions, where they were put to work on the Church's
land. The term remanescentes (translated variously as remnants,
remainders, or descendants) was used to describe newly reconstituted
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 198.
69. Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and
American Indian Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239, 248-49 (2005).
257
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
indigenous groups in Brazil from the beginning of the renewal process. 70
By recognizing these groups and providing them with land and rights as
Indians, the Brazilian government is recognizing a previously
unacknowledged link to a historical crime committed by the colonial
authorities, the state, and the Catholic Church. This decision, made by
both the state and the church, 71 represents the recognition that a "claim
to indigeneity is a claim to justice based not simply on historical priority
but a sense of historical injustice"; such indigenous identities are
"dynamic and processual and rooted in contemporary social relations,
even as [people] invoke an historical perspective to make sense of who
they are."72 After all, it may be unjust, from a historical perspective, if
the descendants of those who had their identity stolen are denied rights
while those who happened to live beyond the reach of the colonial
powers are unquestionably recognized as indigenous.
Brazil's solution to this potential injustice came about as an
unintended consequence of the Indian Statute of 1973.73 Brazil's
military government, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, enacted this law to
regularize property rights in the Amazon region to protect the country's
outer reaches from invasion by foreigners. The intention of the statute
was to remove Indians from areas that could be developed and to place
them in legally demarcated territories called reservas. Although this led
to the disruption of many of the indigenous peoples in the Amazon, it
also "broke political ground for Indians to stake their claims," based on
government recognition of the demarcated territories as dedicated to the
Indians resettled there. 74 As it turned out, that law not only helped
Amazonian Indians in their demands for demarcation of lands and
provision of resources, it also inadvertently provided an opening for
70. Jost MAuRIcIo ARRUTI, MOcAMBO: ANTROPOLOGIA E HIST6RIA DO PROCESSO DE
FORMAQAO QUILOMBOLA 80 (2005).
71. In 1971, Bishops' Councils of the Catholic Church in the Amazon and the Northeast
issued statements condemning historical and continuing dispossession of indigenous
peoples in Brazil. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 36-37. The following year, the church created
the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI), which is still active today supporting groups
throughout the country. Id. at 37.
72. Andrew Canessa, The Past Is Not Another Country: Exploring Indigenous Histories
in Bolivia, 19 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 353, 355, 367 (2008).
73. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 25-26.
74. Seth Garfield, Where the Earth Touches the Sky: The Xavante Indians' Struggle for
Land in Brazil, 1951-1979, 80 HIsP. AM. HIST. REv. 537, 546 (2000). Article 23 of
the Indian Statute of 1973 establishes that "the lands occupied by them in accordance
with their tribal usage, customs and tradition, including territories where they carry on
activities essential for their subsistence or that are of economic usefulness" constitute
territory of the Indians. Estatuto do indio, Lei No. 6001, de 19 de Dezembro de 1973,
DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 21.12.1973 (Braz.), available at
http://www.funai.gov.br/quem/legislacao/estatutoindio.html.
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previously unrecognized descendants of "reduced" Indian mission
communities to demand their newly conceived rights as Indians and not
simply remanescentes.
In 1973, for the first time, the term "Indian" was legally defined in
Article 3 of the Indian Statute as follows: "Indian or forest dweller is
every individual of Pre-columbian origin and ancestry who identifies
himself and is identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose cultural
characteristics distinguish him from the national society."7 5
Previously, indigenous people in Brazil were referred to as forest
dwellers (silvicolas), with the assumption that there was no need to set
out a definition since the only indigenous groups were isolated
Amazonian tribes, each with its own language and cultural practices.
Although the new definition in Article 3 codified an assimilationist
perspective in following Article 4,76 it also allowed for those of "pre-
Columbian origin and ancestry" to identify themselves as Indian, so
long as they were "identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose
cultural characteristics distinguish [them] from the national society."7 7
Within a decade of its enactment, Article 3 of the statute was being used
independently of Article 4, which defined stages of acculturation and
had taken on a life of its own. In practice, the origin and ancestry clause
of Article 4 has been effectively broadened, in part because of the
universal Brazilian belief that all rural people have some indigenous
ancestry, along with African and Portuguese (and Dutch in the
Northeast).7 8 Unlike the United States, African ancestry of an
individual does not trump other ancestries, thus allowing each person
certain flexibility in ethnoracial self-identification. In fact, the statute
does not mention racial characteristics as a condition of Indian
categorization. Paradoxically, in light of the spate of recognitions of
peoples who could be classified as "integrated" under Article 4, it is
precisely that article, with its potential and legally permissible
transformation of ethnic Indians into non-Indians, which requires the
origin and ancestry clause of Article 3 to be virtually ignored as a racial
requirement. If some people can cease being Indians, there is no
impediment for others to become Indians. In the twenty-five years since
redemocratization, the assimilationist perspective has been rejected,
75. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 66-67.
76. Article 4 contains three classifications of indigenous communities: isolated,
integrating, and integrated, reflecting the policy of the government at the time, which was
to encourage, and even force, assimilation into the general population. If found to be
integrated, the government could declare an entire community integrated into Brazilian
society at the request of its members-this has never been requested. Id. at 198 n.42.
77. Id. at 66-67.
78. Id. at 67, 69.
259
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
and indigenous people who move to the city are no longer stripped of
their legal identities as Indians.79 With the newly recognized tribes, the
overall indigenous population has increased dramatically.
) Illustrating the power of definition (or lack thereof), in the case of
Brazil, adding a definition performed the same function as excluding a
definition in the Declaration on an international level. Thus, with Brazil
as- one example of a broadened definition of indigenous peoples, the
undefined term in the Declaration permits a range of groups existing
along a spatial-temporal continuum to claim indigenous rights.80 In
other words, the newly recognized, previously assimilated, northeastern
Brazilian tribes; peoples in Africa and Asia who would not otherwise
meet a definition that requires European colonization or "firstness" in
time; and those, such as the Roma or Gypsies, who do not have a
homeland (even an imagined one), can all claim indigeneity.
CONCLUSION
So long as there is no restrictive definition, a group could be
recognized as indigenous on an international level because indigeneity
should be "sufficiently flexible to accommodate a range of justifications"
and should not be about a list of characteristics or "firstness."81 By
looking at indigenous in terms of justifications, rather than
characteristics, it might be possible to recognize as indigenous "groups
[that] draw upon the international concept of 'indigenous peoples' in
constructing their own identities." 82 In this way, groups "whose self-
concept might not have centered on prior possession may come to
identify themselves as indigenous peoples with experiences and
79. The 1988 Constitution, the first democratically promulgated constitution in
decades, expanded rights of, and protections for, indigenous peoples, but left the 1973
definition in effect.
80. Of course, one should not take the continuum metaphor too literally. In each case, a
group's history is marked by varying relationships to a particular space and/or
identifications. I would like to thank environmental and labor historian Tom Rogers for
making this observation.
81. Kingsbury, supra note 29, at 418. For example, Kingsbury proposes an approach
that "treat[s] historical continuity as an indicator rather than a requirement," thus
emphasizing a "commonality of experiences, concerns and contributions made by groups in
many different regions." Id. at 457. This would "establish a unity that is not dependent on
the universal presence of historical continuity," which traditional analyses have, to date,
almost always considered a justification intrinsic to indigeneity. Id. He argues that such a
justification "does not accurately capture identities and outlooks in some regions not
structured by waves of recent invasion and migration," specifically India and China. Id. at
456.
82. Id. at 450.
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worldviews shared with other indigenous peoples."83 Such an approach
is reinforced by the successful assertion by representatives from Africa
and Asia of their status as indigenous in the negotiations leading up -to
the adoption of the Declaration and by the recognition of reconstituted
Indian tribes in Brazil.
Firstness in time and place is less important than the common
conditions of people who consider themselves to be indigenous and claim
rights as such. Although a common reaction when discussing this issue
is incredulity that a legal document could lack a definitional section,
upon further reflection, it becomes apparent that a lack of definition can
serve as a suture, an impetus for common struggle. Further, the success
of peoples currently self-identifying as indigenous, in being accepted by
the international community, should be more fully incorporated into
anthropological analyses of identity formation, especially as this success
is connected to supranational and state entities and practices. In fact,
the decision to exclude a definition from the Declaration brings that
document closer to an anthropological perspective on cultural practices
and identity formation. 84 Working to understand how particular
indigenous peoples incorporate their new global indigenous identity will
enhance both international legal and anthropological scholarship and
allow those whose interests are most at stake to be given opportunities
to participate in definitional discussions tied to rights and resources.
83. Id.
84. See Jan Hoffman French, Making Identity: Law, Memory, and Race in Comparative
Perspective in RACE, ROOTS & RELATIONS: NATIVE AND AFRICAN AMERICANS 248 (Terry
Straus ed., 2005) (comparing the use of blood quantum for determining Indian identity in
the United States and the use of cultural indicia and self-identification in Brazil).
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